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I. INTRODUCTION 
Warfare is an activity . that has occupied human-kind throughout the 
history of the species1 It is an activity that man has pursued with 
seemingly unflagging enthusiasm, into it he has poured immense· physical 
and creative effort and the end result is a sum of human misery that is 
incomprehensible. To speak of regulating war, of limiting its effects 
and protecting non-combatants, seems farcical considering the record 
of man's inhumanity to man. Yet there is a "law of war", there are 
accepted norms of conduct that, while they may on occasions be 
spectacularly flouted~ can and do serve as moderating influences~ 
In the last hundred years international conferences have codified 
aspects of the law of war, the promulgated rules being widely accepted 
as laying down the recognised standards for the treatment of non-
combatants in times of war. Among the most authoritative of these 
codes have been the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 and. the Geneva 
Conventions of 1929 and 1949. The law of the Hague is mainly significant 
for the rules it contains on the protection of non-combatants on the 
battlefiel.d~ whereas the law of Geneva is primarily concerned with 
the plight of non-combatants off the battlefield~ Recently it has 
come to be thought that because of t~e change in the nature of war 
and the way in which it i s conducted these instruments do not sufficien tly 
6 
reflect modern conditions and so need to be updated. 
Accordingly in 1973 the International Committee o.f the Red Cross 
produced two draft additional protocols to the Geneva Conventions of 
1949, the first applying to international armed conflicts, the second 
1. If there was a o ore gentle dawn to the human story we have no record of 
it. Indeed it has been postulated that man's pre-human experiences 
imbued him with a genetic "killer instinct" tha t ensured his survival 
as a species by motivating him towards aggression and warfare. 
However as to that see Desmond Morris The Naked Ape (London, 1967) 
146-186. 
2. As with the Nazi excesses of the Second World War. 
3. For example the Geneva Convention (prisoners of war) of July 27, 1929 
undoubtedly influenced the conditions of prisoners of wa r in the Second 
World War. 
Lf-. Convention Respecting the Laws and. Customs of War on Land (HagueIV) 
October 18, 1907, Section II (Hostilities), Articles 22-28. J.B. Scott 
(ed.) The Hague Conventions And Declarations of 1899 And 1907 2nd ed. 
(New York, 1915) 116-119. L. Friedman (ed.) The Law Of ',far A 
Documentary History Vol. I (New York, 1972) 308. 
5. There are in fact four Geneva Conventions of 1949. The first dealing 
with the amelioration of the conditi on of the wounded and sick in · 
armed forces in the field, the se cond doine the sarre for the wounded 
sick and shipwrecked of the arr.1ed forces at sea , the third dealing t 
LAW LIBRA~; WELLINGTON 
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applying to non-international (internal) armed conflicts. These 
draft protocols were s en t to all signatories of the Geneva Conventions 
of 1949 and to member states of the United Nations, with invitations to 
each state to send diplomatic representatives to a conference to be 
held in Geneva in 1974 to discuss, amend and sign the additional 
protocols. One hundred and twenty states sent delegates to Geneva, as 
did eleven liberation groups and fifty two other interested organisations? 
Conference
8 
sessions were held in Geneva for four years culminating in 
the agreement on the texts of two amended protocols which were opened 
for signature at Berne on December 12, 1977. 
Protocol r9 (which applies in international armed conflicts) contains 
battlefield Articles
10
which attempt to regulate the activities of 
belligerents on the actual battlefield so as to ruinimize the damage that 
warfare usually inflicts upon the civilian population. They do this 
by requiring the belligerents to distinguish at all . times between 
combatants and non-combatants and to direct their military efforts 
only against the forner. The incidenta l destructive tendency of war 
is also regulated by requiring combatants to asse s s the likely daoage 
to the civilian population i •f a particular military operation is 
conducted and to w:eigh that da~age against the military advantage 
anticipated from the successful pros ecution of the operation. 
I+: is these :-..;.~ticles that this p~per is priri:a:r·il,y co:i:- ... r:-, ;.::. with. They 
are the result of collaboration b etween soldiers, diplomats and lawyers 
who were faced with the task of balancing humanitarian interests 
against 11military necessity" so as to produce a set of r ules that 
could realistically be expected to promote the interests of non-
combatants in a combat zone. 'rhis paper will critically evaluate the 
with prisoners of war and the fourth with the protection of civilians. 
For the text of the Conventions see N.Z. T.S~ 1963:3(E). and the 
Schedules of the Geneva Conventions Act 1958. 
6. R.R. Baxter "Nodernizing The Law Of War" (1978) 78 Mil.L.R. 167. 
7. These organisa tions included diverse groups that ran~ed from the Arab 
Lawyers Union to the World Young Woman 's Christian Association. However 
the liberation groups and humanitarian organisa tions h ad only observer 
status, they could debate but not vote. Nevertheless they exerted 
some influence on the Conference , the liberation groups in particular 
being very persuasive. 
8. Its full name is the unwieldly- "Gene va Diploeiatic Conference on the 
Reaffirmation and Develonment of Internat ional Humanitarian Law 
Applicable in Armed Conflicts" - (Hereinafter cii.lled "the Conference''). 
9. For the text of the Protocol I see Final Act of the Diplomatic 
Conference on the Reaffirmation and Develon~e nt of Int e rnational 
Humanitarian Law Applica ble in Armed Conflicts , with Protocol I, 
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Articles in an attempt to ascertain whether a proper b
alance has been 
struck. 
To do this it will first be necessary to examine the t
heoretical 
problems faced by those who attempt to codify the rule
s of war so as 
to be able to place the Articles in their proper persp
ective. The 
paper will then examine each Article to ascertain its 
meaning and its 
impact on the existing law. Since the Articles are in
tended to 
guide the actions of men in battle it ,.,ill also be nec
essary to view 
them from a pragmatic tactical point of view to see wh
at their likely 
influence will be. Finally it will be useful to relat
e the Articles 
to the New Zealand Army to see what impact they will hav
e on its 
training programmes. 
II. POLITICS 1 SOVEREIGNTY AND MILI
TARY NECESSI'l'Y. 
The formulation of norms of international law is large
ly a political 
process. International society is characterised by th
e struggle caused 
by the conflicting interests of the nation states a nd 
thus any codifica-
tion of international law (such as in Protocol I) will involv
e the 
reconciliation of the se i nterests in a process of c oer
cion and compromise . 
As Tunkin puts it: 
11It should be pointed out that the pr ocess of forming a
 customary 
norm of international law, just a s a treaty norm, is t
he process 
of the struggle and co-operation of states. The formu
lati on of 
a customary rule occurs as a result of the intercourse
 of sta tes, 
in which each state strives to consolidate as norms of
 conduct 
those rules which would correspond to its intersts.
1111 
The use of the label "political" to describe the proce
ss of codification 
of international law can not, hm..Jever, be taken too fa
r. Any 
codification process will be based on the current law,
 and the question 
of how the law may be developed, what it should be, w
ill have strong 
elements of practicality. That is, what will work. H
owever, the 
process of deciding what 11should
11 be the law Hill also largely be 
one of the reconciliation of the compe ting intere s ts o
f the states 
involved in a manner that can be described as "politic
al." 
12 
In discussing this point with regard to the Conference
 Baxter concludes: 
Protocol II and Resolutions adopted at the Fourth Sess
ion H.M.s.o. 
(London, 1977) 17. 
10. Articles 48-60. 
11. G.I. Tunkin Theory of Internationa l, La\·/ (t 1 t 
d b 
_ _ rans a e y W.E. Butler, 
11 It is inevitable that considerations other than those_of hum
anity 
should intrude themselves into the law-making process. I
n the 
course of debate about such matters, a state will ·natural
ly 
pursue its own national advantage ••• Moreover, the very c
oming 
together in a conference ... offers an opportunity to seek 
diplomatic and political advantages through manipulation 
of the 
process. Conferences acquire a certain life of their own
 and 
become games played for their own sake. Considerations o
f humanity 
become caught up in what I have elsewhere described as hu
manitarian 
politics. 1113 
Because states are pursuing their national advantage the 
final Act 
of a Conference usually represents much compror.iise and . a 
fulfilment 
of perhaps only the minir:.um require r1ents of the states. 
The Report 
of the United States Delegation to the Conference describe
s the 
political contest that formed the basis of the proceeding
s. 
11 ••• we were able to make clear from the outset that we wer
e not 
prepared to pay a high price in terms of military effectiv
eness 
or political barnacles in order to obtain tr ea ty provision
s that 
we desired ••• and we worked a.ssiduously with allied deleg
ations 
and with the Soviet Union to ensure that the other major m
ilitary 
1 L1-
pov;ers had similar approaches. 11 
According to the Report this approach, along wi th the 
11 g eneral acceptance 
of the fact that an agree:Jent unacceptable to tne maJor po
wers was 
not Horth having
1115made it possible to achieve reasonable compromises 
that met at least the minimum require me nts of the delegati
ons present. 
Thus although the law-oaking process involved intermingled
 aspects 
of law and practicality the final text was much influenced
 by political 
considerations, considerati ons that arose because of the n
ature of the 
international community and in particular because of the d
octrine of 
sovereignty. As a result of this when the subject being c
odified is 
as sensitive as the lm·1 of 1riar the final text is likely to
 reflect 
the fact that it is a compromise between sharply divergent
 vie~s. 
A. S0verei5nty. 
It is submitted that the success of the l a w-making process
 in producing 
Harvard 1974) 114 
12. See J. Brierly "The Future of Codification
11 (31) B.Y.I.L. 1. 
13. R.R.Baxter, supra note 6, 166. 
14. Extract from the Re ~ort of the U.S. Dele ge t ion r P~r odu
ced by J.A. Boyd 
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clear statements of law containing precise rules and hence clear 
obligations will larg~ly depend upon how far the subject being codif
ied 
lies within the jealous ambit of sovereignty. For sovereignty
 
is a term that refers to the proud autonomy of states, an autonomy 
rooted in a nationalism which will not readily cede national control 
over matters vitally affecting the statel
6 
This does not mean that the doctrine of sovereignty is unyielding, 
there are many situations ,·There it is advantageous for states to 
regulate internationally matters that affect all states. It is nece
ssary, · 
for example, to have efficient international civil aviation services 
and states will admit a derogation of their sovereignty (or, as migh
t 
be argued, exercise their sovereignty) to bind themselves to explici
t 
obligations in this area;
7 However, as the subjects to be codified come 
closer to the sovereign heart of a nation there grows a reluctance t
o 
be closely bound. Of course the reciprocal benefits stimulus may st
ill 
cause states to wish to conclude international agreements on such 
subjects, but since agreement usually entails reaching a consensus, 
and that process involves (as we have seen) compromise to neet minim
um 
acceptable standards, this can result (especially where j_nterests ar
e 
s harply dive rgent) in an instrument containing. imprecise sto..ter.ients 
of principle, sometimes negatived b y a proviso, that leaves states 
much room for discretion~
8 
-15. 
16. 
18. 
in 11 Contem" ora1•y Practice of the United States Relating to Inter-
nati.onal Law 11 (1978) 72 A.J.I.L. 390 
J. bid. 
ll' .. Lauterpacht so.w the unwillingness of states to allow their 
sovereignty to be fettered as one of the ~ain factors contributing 
to the ~rtificiality of international law: 
"The deficient reality of international law is the result not so 
much of its deliberate breaches by States as of their refusal to 
submit, in the first instance, · to the normal incidents of the rule 
of law as generally under.stood. That attitude is commonly describerl
 
as the unwillingness to abandon part of th e s overeignty of States 
in the international sphere. That description , though trite, and 
nearly tautologous, is accurate." H. Laute rpacht Collected Papers 
Vol. II The Law Of Pe a ce (ed. E. Lauterpacht, Cambridge, 1975) 33 
For example the Convention on International Civil Aviation of 
December-7, 1944. 
A.2.~.guably the Definition or Aggression adopted by the General 
Assembly of the United Nations in resolution 33 14(XXIX) at the 2319t
h 
plenary meeting on 14 December, 1974 illustr ates so~e of these point
s. 
And see G. Schwarzenber ger International LaH As Applied By Internat -
ional Courts And Tribunals Vol. II The Law Of Armed Conflict 
(London, 1968) 10-13 for a discussion of the typology of the rules o
f 
war and the relationship of their substantive content to their 
conflict with the dictat es of sovereignty. 
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The problems posed by sovereignty to codifiers become almost insurmount~ble 
when the matter proposed for re gulation is war. For at the core of the 
doctrine of sovereignty lies the right of a state to maintain and defend 
its national and territorial integrity. In time of war these are 
absolutely threatened and consequently sovereignty in wartime exists in 
its most rampant and unbridled form. To draft an international document 
containing rules to regulate the manner in which a state martially protects 
itself is therefore a tremendously difficult task. To give such rules 
substantive content and meaning is even mo~e difficult1 9 
B. Military Necessity and Humanitarian PrinciEle. 
However there are obvious advantages in having international agreement on 
what are acceptable practices of war. It is in the interests of all states 
to limit the r a vages of war, to reduce the suffering and destruction to 
a minimum. This is the ai!J of the law of war 1 to take proper cognizance 
of humanitarian principles. The force acting against this aim is 
military necessity. That is, the s overeign right of a state to take s uch 
military actions as are necessary to defend its s overeignty. As was 
referred to in the Introduction the test of an instru~ent regulating wa.r-
fare is how well the balance between these competing forces has been 
struck. 
In keeping with the above discussion of the effects of sovereignty one 
might expe ct that in an ins trument regulating warfare humanitarian 
obligations will be expressed with les s ening precision as they come to 
conflict more deeply with military nece s sity. Schuarze nberger in fact 
identifies four types of rule of war according to the extent to which they 
conflict with military necessity~O 
The first type of rule prohibits wanton acts of destruction that are of 
no military value and so do not conflict with the necessities of war. 
Thus the rules of warfare c a n be most effective and be stated most precisely; 
The second type of rule li::!lits warfare 11in cases in .-1hich considerations of 
civilisation demand priority over military intcres ts. 1121 For example 
the prohibition of the use of: poison and poisone d weapons,
22 
19. For example at the Conference int e r es ts diverge d between the modern 
high-t e chnology arued force s and those more underdeveloped nations 
who rely on massed manpower. Each side wished to have rules that 
would favour their situation. To find a text ac ceptable to both sides 
wa.s surely a S or<l i an task , \·ihet::er that text has substant :i.ve content 
will be generally exanined lat~r in the paper. As to this ~o int see 
the Report of tte U.S. Deleeati on , su~ra note 14, 390; an~ see also 
R. Bax t e r, surra note 6, 167. 
20. G. Sch~·iarzenb2r ge r, su-pi·a . not <:: 18, 10-13. 
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The third type of rule is a true co:npr omise between the requirements 
of huma ni tarie.nism and the necessities of war. For example the '. ~ 
St Petersburg Declaration of 186823 prohibiting the use of explosive 
or inflammable :projectiles below 400 gram.mes in weight. 
The fourth type of rule is merely a bow to humanity. I t is purely 
admonitory, military necessity is in practice unchecked. For exan.ple 
·whereas Article 25 of the Ilague Regulations on Land Warfare of 1907 
absolutely prohibits the attack or borabardment of undefended places, 
Articles 26 and 27 show that if a place i s defended the necessities of 
war are overriding as far as limiting surprise bombardment and indiscrimi-
nant destruction are concerned~4 
It is arguable that this typology supports the submissions advanced 
above on the effects of sovereignty on the codification of international 
law. It also shows that military necessity must be finely judged if 
the rules of war are not to exhibit "a mischievous propensi ty to unrealit~~ 
C. Defining Military Necessiti. 
It has been said that the essence of war is violence, and that moderation 
in war is imbecility , but practice has s h own that th e conduct of 
belliger~nts can be moderated in an effective manner. In other words 
humanitarian considerations have been able to raise a threshold which 
must be crossed before acts can be said to be militarily necessary 
( type three o f Schv;arzenberger 's analysis). What considerations can 
a chieve this moderation of belligerent activity? 
The answer, cynical though it may be, is self-int e re s t. For warfare 
is the ultima te means by which one state can enforce its will upon 
another state in a struggle that can end in the destruction of the 
vanquished's sovereignty. To protect that sovereignty a nation will 
muster all the resources it can command and employ whatever methods 
it decides offer it an advantage. The question in fact becomes one 
21. Ibid; 11. 
22. For a further discussion of why such a prohibition exists and is 
effective see G. Schwarzenberger The Legality of Nuclear i'/eapons 
(London, 1958) 26 et seq. 
23. L.Friedman (e d ), supra note 4, 192 for the te x t of the Declaration. 
2aj . J.B. Scott (ed.), su;ra note 4, 117-11 8 ; L Fried~an (ed.), supra 
note 4, 318-319. 
25. H. Lauterpa cht, supra n o t e 16, 37. 
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of advantage , but of strategic and not necessarily tactical a~vantage. For instance, though both sides in the Second ~orld War possessed gas 
and bacteriological weapons, weapons which tactically would have been 
devastatingly effective, neither sd.de evar employed them. The reason 
was that neither side cared to face the consequences of provoking the 
26 other side into using their weapons by first e mploying their own. 
Closely connected with the reciprocity concept is the notion of reprisal. If one belligerent goes beyond the bounds of what is custo~arily considered to be the normal practices of warfare the opposing party can enforce the law b ;f taking retaliatory actions so unacceptable to the belligerent in breach that he will cease the activities which occasioned the reprisal. In many instances the mere threat of reprisal will be sufficient 
to halt unacceptable practices~? 
The purpose of humanitarian law in time of war is to protect those who 
do not directly participate in the hostilities, or who are hors de combat, and to "humanise" combat weapons so that they do not cause "unnecessary" suffering. The fundamental rule of huma.nitarian lmr to ensure this has been formulated by Pic-tet as: 
"••• belligerents shall not inflict on their adversaries harm out of 
, proportion to the object of warfare, wh:ich is to destroy or weaken 28 the military strength of the enemy." 
Shorn of sentiment the rule is a telling o~e . for it is only l~gi~a: that the most efficient way to employ military strergth is to expend it 
against military targets . If this is understood by the combatant then the laws of humanity \·rill be much advanced~ Of cour se it is not as simple as that, a major problem for instance (and one which ,.,,as grappled with in drafting Protocol I) is in defining "military target". 
Another moderating influence is the strategic consideration of the post-war situation. If a war is aimed at comple tely destroying the enemy then feN of the above considerations will apply, but if the object is to gain control of territory or to extend political influence then moderation 
26. In 1935 the Italians u sed ~ustard g~s in t heir campaign against the Ethiopian tribesr,.1 en. This \JBS in contra venti on of the Gas Protocol of Geneva of 1925, but it must be noted that the Ethiopians did not have the capacity to retaliate in kind, a f2ctor that sh ows the effjca cy of the nega tive reciprocity principle - tha t is to say it is unlikely that the gas would have been used if the Ethiopians had been capable of reprising. 
27. More will be said on the ques tion o f re prisals in that paft of the paper that deals with the individua l battlefield Articles. 28. J. Pictet Humanitarian Law And 'T'he ProtP, ction Of ':Jar Vic-t:;i,,~s (Genev~, 1975) 31 
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in the means and methods of war used may well be in the belligerent's 
favour when looking ahead to the end of the war~
9 An ex-enemy 
embittered by harsh treatment will make a far less tractable neighbour 
than one who has little cause for complaint in this area. And in such 
bitterness be the seeds of future war, not to mention guerilla activity 
against occupying forces. Besides it will not be to the advantage of a 
victor to occupy a blasted land that cannot support its remaining inhabi-
tants let alone contribute resources to benefit the occupiers. Indeed, 
conditions may even demand that the victor succor the vanquished~O 
However, the effects of the above influences developed through practice 
as customary norms of international law rather than as results of a 
codification exercise. Further their effect varies according to the 
dictates of the particular conflict and the ba lance that is eventually 
struck is one appropriate to the circumstances. In thi s respect the 
"rude practice of war1131 as Johnson puts it develops the customary laws 
of warfare in a manner perhaps more re alistic than the products of 
codifiers. 
"So long as what is done in war is d one cons istently ~ by both sides 1 
with an absence of protest and without excessive reliance on the 
doctrine of reprisa ls ••. this •rude practice' is as good a method as 
any of developing the customary laws of warfare. It sometimes works 
better than the method of drawing up conventions in peacetime , 
b~sa use such conventio r s ~re apt to be preparej bg~~nst a background 
of pressures which have little to do with the realities of war.
1132 
- , 
29. This point is emphasised by the reflection that in real terms a war 
does not end simply on the cessa tion of hostilities. The effects of 
those hostilities are ongoing and the goals for which the war was 
fought must be pursued vigourously when the hostilities end if the 
victor is not to "win the war but lose the pe:;:.ce". See R. Baxter, 
supra note 6, 167. 
30. In ass essing the re s ult of the Allied bombing progra!IlL'le in the Second 
Horld War, Chur·chill wrote a · mem.orandum that reveals his under-
standing of these principles. The unexpurgated version of this memo-
ra.ndum is reproduced in D. Johnson Rights In Air Space (Manchester, 
1965) 51. 
31. Ibid:, 27 
32. Ibid. The criticism might also be added that such conventions may be 
drawn up to account for specific situations experienced in a previous 
conflict, and thus they look backwards although they will be expected 
to apply in future conflicts where the situations may be entirely 
different. 
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The pressures of war are perhaps the most conpelling a nation can 
face, and they will vary depending on the nature of the conflict. A 
guerilla-type war will demand different patterns of conduct from the 
belligerents than a conventional war, and even within a war patterns will 
change as the conflict lengthens into a contest of attrition or as 
attitudes become coarsened with time and combat. The moderating 
influences are rooted in self-interest and operate almost automatically 
in the sense that as soon as hostilities are co~menced compelling logic 
will demand that they be considered. The extent to which they can act as 
humanizing influences will depend on the conflict, and as the patterns 
of conflict change so \too will their relative effect. 
Given that this isro can a code such a s Protocol I add to the efficacy of 
the customary norms? Can a written code, sired for humanity and nurtured_ 
politically, be flexible enough not to be discarded as contradicting 
necessary actions of war, yet be sufficiently c oncrete to modify the reeans 
and methods of conduct along humanitaria n lines?33 
These queries can, it is submitted, be answered in the affirmative. A 
written code in this a r ea can clarify th e existing law so as to define the 
parameters of customarily accepted conduct. If due atten tion is paid to 
the realities of combat a code can lay down guidelines which will aid a 
combatant in determining the scope of his ac tions, In this way a 
o.f conduct could be achieved which would :::illeviate the coarsr.:ning effect 
of protracted war and emphasise the reciprocity principle. 
However, the value of such a code can only be fully reali s ed if it is 
used by the nations of the world as an authoritative training reference 
to be incorporated in their military training progra~mes. The combatant 
must be educated in the code so as to crea te an ex:ectation of conduct 
in his mind, and to know that his acti ons mu s t conform to that expectat~ 34 ion. 
33. Draper (G. I .A .D ,Draper "The Emerging Law Of \·Jeapons Restraint" ( 1977) 19 Survival 9.), has suggested that the drafters of Protocol I may have added to the unreality of the laws of war. His contentions will be discussed later, but for the present the point needs to be made that if the "extra-legal" forces behind the Conference made inevitable an unreal text then this is a serious criticism of the law-making process (or, as Lauterpacht (supra note 16, ibid) would have it, eviclence of the 11artificiali ty 11 , in substantial respects of the Law of Nations conceived as a system of th e effective rule of law). 34. To achieve this the rules mu3t be for mulo t e d so precisely that combatants of all nations agree on the nature of their obligations. For if the provisions are drafted too broadly subsequent interpretations as reflected in the nations' training progra~~es could create 
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It is evident from the above discussion that the drafters of Protocol I 
had no easy task, and it is in the light of these problems and theories 
that the paper now turns to examine the battlefield Articles. 
III THE BATTLEFIELD ARTICLES OF PROTOCOL I 
A. Article L~8 - The Basic Principle 
Article 48 enunciates the basic principle from which all the succeeding 
Articles follow. 
"In order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian 
population and civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall 
at all times distinguish between the civilian population and 
combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives and 
accordingly shall direct their operations only against military 
obj ectives. 1135 
That the necessity of making this distinction lies at the root of the 
humanitarian laws of war has long been recognised. The preamble to the 
Declaration of St Petersburg of 1868 states: 
n ••• the only legitimate objact ,-,hich Statec should endeavour to 
accomplish during war is to weaken the military forces of the enemy. 1136 
Here the interests of the combatant and the hur~anitarian coivcide, for 
to the co~batant the question is how best to expend his military force 
against the military capacity of his enemy while to the humanitarian it 
is how to keep t he civilian p opulation outside the ambit of mili tary 
operations~? 
dissimila r expectations ot conduct in the minds of the combatants, to the detriment of humanity and to the law of \-:ar. See G. Draper, supra note 33, 15. 
35. Article 48, supra note 9, 46. Notice that this is in accord with the fundamental rule of humanitarian law as formulated by Pictet, supra note 28 .. 
36. L. Friedman (ed.), supra note 4, 192 
37. "The problem of the protection of the civilia n population can be approached from two different standpoints. From the humanitarian standpoint, it must be considered how the Parties in the confli~t, who do not have an unlimited rit,ht to adopt means of injuring the enemy can leave the civilian po~ulation outside the sphere of the effects - of military operations . From the military standpoint, it is more a question of how the Parties can concentrate their opera-tions on the d.istru.ction of the enemy military resource s . 11 
"Protection Of The Civilian Population Against Dane;ers Of Hostilit;i.es" Document CE/36, 11 submitted by the Internationa l Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva, January 197·1 to the Conference of Government Experts on the Reaffir~ation and Develon- ent of Int e rnational Hurr.ani tarian Law Applicable in Ar::1ed Confli c ts. 
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The theoretical possibility of accomplishing this has already been 
discussed and no more need be said here. The remainder of this section 
of the paper is concerned with the way in which the battlefield Articles 
imple ,nent the principle. 
B.Article 51 - Protection of the Civilian Ponulation. 
Article 51 is the first substantive regulatory Article with which this 
paper is concerned~
8 
it confers on the civilian population and individual 
civilians general protection against dangers arising from military 
operations. To give effect to this protection Article 51 enunciates 
several rules which"••• shall be observed in all circumstances. 1139 
In order to appreciate the significance of these rule s it is necessary 
to first examine the law relating to the protection of civilians as 
it stood before Protocol I. 
a. Protection Of Civilians Before Protocol I. 
In ancient (and not so ancient) times the pr op e rty and persons of the 
enemy's civilian population were literally the victors' spoils. The 
anticipation of such spoil was one of the chief cotivating factors of 
the soldiery of the time , ther~her the prospect of pillage the more 
martially inclined the soldier . As nation states became more organised 
wars tended to be fought between re latively small profes~ional ar~ies. 
Rape, loot and pillage were still 11 perk::;" of the ,j ob, but the p ractices 
were bec');'.i": ._; frowned upon and dttempts l"lere o:::in6 mc-C:.c: t(., lirr,it the 
effects of war of the civilian population~O 
In 1874 a group of soldiers, diplomats and lawyers from fifteen nations met 
in Brussels to draft an international declaration concerning the laws 
and customs of war. Although a text was produced it was never ratified 
by the nations concerned because of political dissent, but the principles 
enunciated showed the expectations of the time and spurred the calling 
41 
of further confere nces. 
Article 12 of the Declaration of Brussels as adopted by th~t Conference 
restated the basic tenet of the St Petersburg Declaration of 1868. 
11 The laws of war do not allow to belligerents an unlimited power 
as to the choice of means of injuring the enemy." 
In the St Petersburg Declara tion this preambular statement applied only 
38. The definition Articles (49 & 50) will be de a lt with as they arise. 
39. Article 51, papa . 1. See Annex I. 
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to the military forces of the enemy, but the Branch Conference extended 
it to forbid:· 
"All destruction or seizure of the property of the enemy which is 
42 not imperatively required by the necessity of vmr." 
Further, only defended places could legitimately be attacked, undefended . 
~ concentrations of civilians could be neither attacked or bombarded. 
If a place was defended the commander of the attacking forces was 
supposed "except in tbe case of surprize" to do all in his power to 
warn the authorities of the impending attack~
4 
Even in the course of 
the attack buildin~devoted to civilian purposes such as hospitals 
and churches were to be spared so long as they were not being used for 
military purposes~5 
The next codifying effort was made in the summer of 1899 when 
representatives of twenty-six states met in the Hague to codify, for the 
first time in history, international rules for the conduct of warfare~
6 
lt7 These were contained in the Conference's secona. Convention and were 
basically an affirmation of the principles of the Brussels Conference 
1+8 and iterated them in practically the same words. 
l· 9 Again in 1907 the delegates of forty-fou; nations cume to the Hague 
to draft a more comprehensive document on the laws of war. The Annex 
to the Fourth Convention (Hague IV) included detailed regulations on 
land warfa re. 
4o. G. Schwarzenberger, supra note 13': 16. 41. L. Friedman (ed.), supra note 4, 152. 42. Article 15, ibid., 197. 
L1-3. Ibid. 
44. Article 16, ibid. 
45. Article 17, ibid. 
46. The Conference was called as the result of an initiative by the Tsar of Russia who was wo~ried that the arms race was leaving .his country far behind because it could not afford to rearm. He thought that if states would agree to freeze the situation and maintain the status quo no-one would be relatively better or worse off and a great deal of expense would be saved. This piece of logic was greeted with some scepticism by the more worlaly nations of Europe who found themselves at the Conference "to save Russia's face 11 but i·rho had no intentions of limiting armaments. Neither did they, but public opinion was s~ strong that they felt they had to achieve something. Thus they concluded three Conventions: on Arbitration; Laws and Customs of War on Land; and Extension of the Geneva Rules to Mari time \far fare; three Declarations: on Projectiles from Balloons, Asphyxciating Gases, and Expanding Bullets; six 11Hishes 11 for future accor:1plishment; and a Resolution. That they achieved even this is surprising considering the temper of the participants. For an entertaining account of the Conference (and an insight into the political process) see B. Tuchman The Proud Tower (New York, 1966) 229-267. 
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Once again the principlea of the Brussels Conference and the Hague 
Conventions of 1899 were reiterated almost verbatum~O 
The attack or bombardment of @defended towns, villages, habitations 
or buildings were absolutely prohibited?
1
but if they were defended the 
commander of the attacking force should still do what he could to warn 
the authorities before bombarding "except in cases of assault.ri52 
Even then civilian objects should be spared~3 and the pillage of a 
captured town or place was specifically prohibited as unlawful~4 
Thus the civilian population was protected from overt attack, provided 
they did not reside in a defended place~5 The provisions of the 
Conventions have long been regarded as customary international law 
binding on all states, and not just those that ratified them~6 
(i) Aerial Warfare 
The First World War ushered in the era of air power, an eventuality 
undreamed of when the Hague Conventions of 1907 were drafted. It soon 
became obvious that new rules would be necess2,ry to cover this new method 
of warfare, although in the beginning s ome attecp t was made to stretch 
the Hague Regulations to encompass it. Two cases involving the bombing 
of cities in the First World War were referrecl t o th e Greco-German Hixed 
Arbitral Tribunal. In Coenca Brothers v. GermanJ7a German air-raid 
on Salonica was held to be "contrary to international law" becauGe of the 
fa~lhre to give the Karni~b rJ~uircd by Article 2C. ?his decision was 
confirmed in Kiriadolou v. German~
8 
in which the attacked city was 
47. J.B. Scott (ed.), supra note l1--;11b. 
48. Ibid. , 117. 
49. The South American nations had been invited, the United States having 
overridden -the 11clistaste" of the European p owers. B. Tuchr.ta:q. supra 
note L1-6, 282. 
50. The 1894 8.( 1907 battlefield Articles (22-28) for exa.mple are practi-
cally identical in wording. J.B. Scott (ed.), supro note 4, 116-118. 
51. Article 25, ibid., 117. 
52. Article 26, ibid., (According to Schwarzenbe rger this proviso made 
the content of the rule non-existent. supra note 18). 
53. Article 27, ibid., 118. 
54. Article 28, ibid. 
55. The Hague Convention on Naval Wa.r fare 1907 used a different test, 
that of military objectives, that had to be satisfied before 
bor:.1bardmen t from the sea could cor,m,en ce. 
56. See H. Lauterpa cht (ed.) Oppenheim's International Law Vol II (7th ed. 
London, 1963) 415-421 and also Respect For Hu man Rights In Armed 
Conflicts Vol I Document A/9215,167. A survey prepared by the U.N. 
Secretariat in 1973. 
57. (1928) 7 Recueil Des Decisions Des Tribunaux Arbitraux Mixtes 683; 
(1927-28) Int. L.R. 570. 
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Bucharest. In the Coenca Brothers trial it was admitted that Article 
26 envisaged only land bombardment but it was held that the principle 
easily extended to aerial warfa re and that bombardment without warning 
could not be permitted. 
It was evident though that the peculiar nature of aerial warfare could 
not satisfactorily be regulated by rules drafted for land warfare. 
For one thing the Hague Regulations of 1907 were concerned with a war 
fought on defined fronts where the only vulnerable civilians would be 
those in occupied territory and those in places within field gun range. 
In this situation the defended status of a place was a relevant criterion 
for basing protection, if the aim was occupation there was no military 
point in bombarding an undefended town. Obviously this criterion was 
irrelevant to aerial warfare where occupation was never the aim. 
1.rhe Conference on the Limitation of Armament was held at Washington in 
1922 during which a resolution was passed establishing a Commission of 
59 
Jurists to look at the regulation of aerial warfare. This Commission 
drafted a code of sixty-two articles, but it was never accepted by the 
Governments and so its status as a declar-ation of internationa l law is 
t . 60 uncer ain. 
The Hague Air Warfare Rules (as they came to be known), Hhile not 
pretending to be exhaustive,
61 were intended to propose a legal regulation 
of the peculiar problems of a erial warfare, including aerial bombardment. 
Article 22 states~ 
"Aerial bombardment for the purpose of terrorizing the civilian 
population, of destroying or damaging private property not of a 
62 
military character, or of injuring non-comha tants is prohibited.
11 
The test of legality of bombardment is no longer whether or not the place 
is defended but is instead whether or not the target is a military 
objective~3 Thus Article 24 states: 
58. (1930) 10 Recueil Des Decisions Des Tribunaux Arbitraux Mixtes 100; 
(1929-30) Int. L.R. 516. 
59. D. Johnson supra note 30, 39 
60. ()-pinion on the matter is divided. See the Secretariat survey supra 
note 56, and H. Lauterpacht (ed.) supra note 56. 
61. Article 62, L Friedman (ed.) supra note 4, 449. 
62. Ibid., (440) 
63. The test in fact adopted by the Hague Convention on Naval Warfare of 
1907. See J.B. Scott (ed.) supra note 4, 157. 
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•'1) Aerial bombardment is legitimate only when d ::i. r e cted at a military 
objective, that is to say, an object of which the destruction or 
injury would contribute a distinct oiJ.itary advantag e to the 
belligerent. 
2) Such bombardment is legitimate only wh e n directe d exclusively at the 
following objectives: ~ilitary forces; military works; military 
establish~ents or depots; factories constituting important and well-
known centres engaged in the oanufacture of arrnsi ammunition, or 
distinctively military supplies; lines of coffi munication or trans-
portation used for military purposes. 
3) The bombardment of cities ••• or buildings not in the immediate 
neighbourhood of the operations of land forces is prohibited. In 
cases where the objectives in paragraph 2 are so situated, that they 
cannot be bombarded without the indis criminate bombardment of the 
civilian population, the aircraft must abstain from bomba rdment. 
4) In the immediate neighbourhood of the operations of l a nd forces, t he 
bombardment of cities ••• or buildings is logitimate provided that 
there e x ists a reasonable presumption that the ~ilitary concentration 
is sufficiently i reporta nt to justify such bombar dm e n t, having 
regar~ to the danger thus caused to t h e . civilia n population. 
5) A belligerent State i s liable to p a y compensatio n for i njuries to 
pers on or to property caused by t h e viola tion ••• of the provisions of 
this article. 1164 
This Article obviously represents a considera ble advo.nc e over the previou s 
law in both its particula rity a nd definity. It wa s probably as a result 
of these two cha r a ct eristics t hat t he rules were politica lly unacce p table 
to the governments of the day. 
Article 25 elaborated Article 27 of th e Ha gue Re g ul a tions of 1907 oy~-
extending to aircraft the prohibition a gainst the bomba r dment of buildi.n~s 
dedica ted to public worship, art, the care of th e s ick a nd other cultural 
monuments ( provided -ihe y were not a t th e time ·be i n f used for military 
purpos es)~5 
Art-icle 26 of the Rule s enabled a state to esta blish a zone of prote ction 
for i Bportant historic monument s ins i d e which no bomb a r dment would tak e 
pla c e provid e d t he othe r Pm1en; were notified, t he zones were clearly 
64. supr a note 61. 
65. Ibid., 
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marked, were not used for military puiposes and were open to inspection 
b t 1 ·tt 66 y a neu ra commi ee. 
The efficacy of the Rules was soon to be put to the test as 1939 heralded 
another world-wide descent into barbarism. On September 1, 1939 
President Roosevelt appealed to the governments of Europe to declare 
that they would "in no event and under no circumstances undertake bombard-
ment from the air of civilian populations or unfortified cities, upon 
the understanding that the same rules of warfare shall be scrupulously 
observed by all their opponents. 1167 
On September 2 the British and French Governmenta ,agreed that they would 
not bomb from the air "any except strictly military objectives in the 
68 narrowest sense of the worci. 11 A fortnight later Germany announced 
that she also would adhere to the principle, provided that this adherence 
was reciprocated~9 
Despite these reciprocal protestations the concept of 11 total war" soon 
eviscerated their substance. Cities were bombed and levelled, often 
for the purpose of terrorising their civilian inhabitants. Target-
area ( 11 carpet 11 ) bombing was adopted_ by the Allies as a method of 
shattering not only the enemy's ability to produce war ma~erials but also 
his morale. The distinction between military objectives and civilian 
objects was largely lost as the practice of war vastly expanded the 
definition of the former. The Hague Rules of Air Warfare were not often 
wentio~d<l iu official circles at this time. 
11The area attack of this period was deliberately aimed at the 
destruction of the principal cities of Germany. The object was 
••• to destroy in the centre of the cities, the housing, public 
utilities and communications to such an extent that their inhabitants 
would not be able to go on working. Though, on occnsion, individual 
factories or groups of factories were designated as the centre of 
the target and it was also hoped that many would be destroyed or 
seriously damaged by the overspill of the area attack, it was the 
destruction of the living quarters of the towns which was the main 
object of the attack. The worker was to be deprived of the ~eans of 
66. Ibid., 
67 •. D. Johnson, supra note 30, 47. 
68. Ibid. 
69. H. Lauterpacht (ed.), supra note 56, 527. 
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working by the devastation of his environment. Though the destruction 
of the will to work ha d in this period been made secondary to the 
destruction of the means to work, yet there was in the minds of some 
in Britain the thought that such demoralisation would be caused as 
to result in a general refusal to work under such conditions. 1170 
However, the practice of carpet-bombing proved to be costly in terms 
of lost aircraft and aircrew and the results were not what were expected?1 
Morale was not shattered (in fact there wer e indications that it 
strengthened into stubborn resolution)~2 and the effects on war 
production did not justify the losses incurred. Further there was the 
post-war situation to be considered. Sir Winston Churchill in a minute 
written in the latter stages (28 March, 1945) of the war summed up 
the strategic position with his usual firm grasp of reality: 
"It seems to me that the moment bas come when tbe question of bombing 
of German cities simply for the sake of increasing the terror, though 
under other pretexts, should be reviewed. Otherwise we shall come 
into control of an utterly ruined land. We shall not, for instance, 
be able to get housing materials out o f Germany for on.:•. Olm needs 
because some temporary provision would have to be made for the 
Germans themse lves. The destruction of Dresden remains a serious 
query against the conduct of Allied bombing. I am of the opinion that 
military objectives must henceforward be more strictly studied in 
our own interests rather than that of t he enemy ••• I f eel the need 
for more precise conce n tration u~on military objectives, such as 
oil and co~munications behind the i~rnediate battlezone, rather 
than on more a cts of terror and wan ton destruction, however impressivi~,, 
What was l eft of the principle that a distinction should be made between 
military objectives and civilian objects at the end of the Second World 
War? The charg e of indiscriminate bombing of the civilian population 
70. C. 1ilebs ter and N. Frankland 'rhe S tra teeic Air Offensi vc Ap.:ainst 
Germany 1939-1945 Val II Endeavour H.M.S.O, (London, 1961) 235 
The re sult of this policy was ex-Jlained by Sir Arthur Harris ( Officer 
Commanding Bom"t>er Command) who, on Nove mber 3, 1943, gave the 
Prime Minister a list of nineteen German towns ·.-rhich had been 
"virtua lly destroyedn. By t his phrase he oeant to express a 
de gree of devastation which made the town Ma liability to the total 
GerrJo.n war effort vastly in excess of any assets remaining". As 
a further indication of Hhat had been a chieved ai;:;ainst these towns 
(among the m Hamburg, Cologne, Essen, and Dort~und) Harris compared 
their condition with that of Coventry. There 100 out of 1,9,?2 
acres had been devastated. In Hamburg it was 6,200 out of 8,382 acres, in Essen 1,030 out of 2,630 a cr ~s . Ibid., 47-48. 
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was included in the indictment of the German maj or war criminals 
before the International Military Tribunal at Nuremburg, but no 
convictions were brought in?
4 H. Lauterpacht argue$ that this was 
because the practice was widespread on both sides, and not because it 
was no longer illegal. 
'~lliile such a basis of exculpation is controversial, it leaves 
open the possibility for the view - which is believed to be the 
accurate view - that indiscriminate strategic target-bombing 
is unlawful when judged by the established standards of the tradi-
tional distinction b etween combatants and non-combatants. 1175 
Other jurists are not so sure. ProfeGsor Schwarzenberger v,rites that 
the practice of World War Two has reduced the distinction between 
b t t d b t t 1 t t 'h' . t 76 H corn a ans an non-com a ans a mos o vanis ing poin. e sees 
in the trends of the two world wars (an in the Vi et-Nam experience) 
a tendency towards total war, war in which no real distinction iG made 
bet,-1een combatants and non-combatants. 
11 In viow of the conduct of air wci.rfare during the Second World '.far 
and in Viet-Nara, the inconclusiveness in this respect of relevant 
post-1945 treaties a nd the generally known prepar a t ions 418.de by 
all major Powers for air and missile warfare ••• it appears 
i mpoasible to stata with any confidence tha t near-total air and 
mi f3sile ,-1;::i.rfare rnns cnurte.,,. t o the conte~porar;r 1~',;;:; and custonc 
of war. 1177 
Lauterpacht concedes that the practice of nations has reduced the 
distinction between combatants and non-co~batants ''into a hollow 
phrase1178 but maintains that the seed kernal of the law remains as 
"unchallenged principle": 
i '1That uncha llenged principle is embodied in the rule that non-
corubatants, whether in occupied territory or elsewhe r e , must not be 
made the object of attack unrelated to military operations and 
directed e x clusively against them. 1179 
71. In terms of production the loss of armaments directly due to area 
bombing in 1943 and 1944 was only about 5%. Ibid., 252. 
72. Ibid., 237-243. 
73. G. Webster and N. ~'rankland The Strategic Air Offe nsive Against 
Gernany 1939-1945 Vol III Victory H. M.s.o. (Lond on, 1961) 112; 
D. Johnson supra note 30, 39. 
74. H. Lauterpacht (ed.), supra note 56, 529. 
75. Ibid., 530 
76. G. Schwarzenberger supra note 18 , 159. 
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In other words all that remains forbidden is the express terrorisation 
of the civilian population, a rule that in practical terms seems to 
differ little from Schwarzenberger's conclusion that "near-total" war 
is not illegal. Especially as Lauterpacht considers that the practice 
of the Second World War made controversial the assumption that the 
civilian population as such is entitled to protection. That is to 
say he considers it controversial whether an attack is prohibited because 
the presence of large numbers of civilians in the vicinity of the target 
would make great damage to· the civilian population inevitable. 
In the Second World War civilian :protection became nominal as the concept 
of legitimate military objectives became so enlarged as "to lose in 
Bo fact any legally relevant content''• In this respect, admits 
Lauterpacht, the prohibition against terrorization can be of limited 
practical us;
1 
for in most cases centres of civilian population will 
contain military objectives the destruction of which will nean the 
destruction of the civilian objects and consequent terroris2tion. Such 
terrorization could motivate the attack while plausibly being passed 
off as only incidental to the destruction of military targets. 
Hm-,ever, if Schwarzenberger is correct in saying that the adoption of 
near-total warfare has obliterated the dis tinction between combatants 
and non-combatants then the foundation of the huma nitarian rules of law 
has disappeared. Lauterpacht realises this and (quite naturally) 
prefers to conclude that the final prohibition remains: 
"Nevertheless it is in that prohibition, v1hich is a clear rule of 
law, of intentional terrorisa tion - or destruction - of the civilian 
population as an avowed or obvious object of attack that lies the 
last vestige of the claim that war can be legally regulated at all, 
without that irreducible principle of restraint there is no limit to 
the licence and depravity of force. If stark terror and p2nic 
dissolving all bonds of organised life are an object ~t which the 
belligerent can legitimately aim, there is no reason why he should 
stop short of murdering the inhabitants of occupied territory -
for such action is certain to create terror both in the occupied 
territory and in territory which he threatens to occu-py ••• It is 
clear that adciGsion of a ri ght to re s ort to the cre a tion of terror 
among the civilian population as being a legitimate object per se 
77. Ibid. 
78. H. Lauterpacht (1952) 29 B.Y.I.L. 360,364. 
79 . Ibid., 365. 
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would inevitably mean the actual and formal end of the law of 
warfare. For that reason, so long as the assumption is allowed to 
subsist that there is a law of Har, th e prohibition of the weapon 
of terror not incidental to lawful operations must be regarded as an 
82 absolute rule of la1 ... " 
Johnson agrees with this conclusion basing his analysis on the practice 
of states and writes that modern international law permits •strategic' 
and, of course, •tactical' bombing in time of war 1 but forbids 'terror-
bombing' • 83 
It is submitted that so far as aerial warfare was concerned the Second 
World War came very close to denying, in Lauterpacht's words, 11 that 
(aerial) war can be lega lly regulated at all". For e:;:ample, towards 
the end of that war the Allies decided that a blm; of "catastro;,hic 
force" should be aimed at German civilian morale, not to win the wc:1.1', 
but to hasten victory. The decision as to what form the blow should take 
was made without the least regard to international l aw. One suggestion 
was that a number of relatively small towns with populations of about 
twenty thousand should be obliterated. It was disc arded solely, it 
would appear, because: 
11Such attacks I it was shO\·m, would require v i:3ual aiming and v,ould , 
therefore, depend for their success upon good weather, and the 
activity of the American bomber force in daylight. It was unlikely 
that more than thirty such towns could be destroyed in a conth, and 
even if~ hundred were eventually devastated only three per cent of the 
84 German population in relatively unimportant areas would be affec ted. 11 
It is sub~itted that since, as Johnson points out, international law is 
evidenced partly by the practice of states the above exanple raises 
doubts as to whether terror was not an a ccepted ai~ of aerial warfare. 
However one may still conclude that terror in itself was not an accepted 
me thod of war. It was never advocated for the ground and sea forces, 
and it was always denied that it w&s the primary object of the bomber 
raids (Churchill's memorandum notwithstanding). The point has been dealt 
o. Ibid., 
81. Ibid., 368 
82. Ibid., 369 
83. D. Johnson supra note 30, 57. 
8L~. C. Webster and N. Frankland supra note 73, 54. The plan eventually 
opted for was for a massive raid on Dresden, which took place in 
February of 1945 utterly ruining the city. The r a id did not achieve 
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with at some length here because it w~s this situation that the drafters 
of Protocol I were look;ng back upon Hhen they prepared part of Article 
51, and in order to appreciate their efforts it is necessary to have 
some idea of what in fact they are trying to regulate. 
(ii) \'iar On Land. 
As to land warfare the situation at the end of the Sec.and World War 
was similar in that the bombardment of civilian concentrations was 
accepted practice but only if concentrations contained military objec-
tives. In this area the Hague Regulations of 1907 specifically applied, 
and though they prohibit the bombarding of undefended civilian 
concentrations, they do not protect civilians absolutely. If a town 
contains military objectives it nay be bombarded despite probable civilian 
losses. Some regulation is made to protect cultural and other objects 
(hospitals and the like), but the protection is minimal.~5 
However the prohibition against terrorisation and wanton destruction 
is well established and 
the Second World War~6 
,.;as applied by Military Tribunals at the end of 
But the point remaining is that assault, siege 
and bombardment are i n t hems~lves le gitima te mea n s of ~arfare, t h e 
probability of incidenta l civilran loss is irrelevant and may even be 
counted as a factor that will persu~de th e besie ged of the advisability 
of surrender . 
b. Article 51 In Context 
Paragraph 1 of Article 51 confers on civilians87 a "general protection 
against dangers arising from military operations 11 •
88 
This initial 
state~ent immediately widens the whole scope of t h e exis ting law of the 
Hague, for the 11 general protectionr1 means that not only are civil ians to 
be immune from direct attack aimed specifically at the r.1 , they are to 
be protected as much as possible from the incidental effects of warfare. 
'rhe significance of this Hhen related back to the Second t"Jorld \far 
practice ( particularly with regar d to aerial warfare) is imnediately 
apparent. 
P~raGraph 2 states in ~bsolute terms that the civilian population as 
such is not to be the object of attack nor subjected to violence the 
p rimary purpose of which is to spread terror araong the~. Thus the vital 
principle of law that Schwarzenbe r f er feared had almost been lost in the 
its purpose , it did not break the morale of the GerLlan people . 
85. Article 27 J.B. Scott (ed.), sunra note 4, 11 8 . 
86 . See In re Holsteln and Other s (1949) 8 War Crimes Re ports 9; 9 Int. L.R. 261. Re Sza bad os (1 949) 9 W&r Cri~es Re ports 59; 9 Int. L .R. 261. 
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practice of the Second vforld War, and which Lauterpacht refused on 
principle to discard is here peremptorily affirmed . 
Paragraph 3 directs that civilians shall be protected 11unless and for 
such times as they take a direct part in hostilities~. The adjective 
11direct 11 was included so as to protect civilians ,-1ho indirectly participate 
in hostilities by, for example, grO\·:ing food for troops or working in 
a munitions factory. An example of civilians taking a direct part in 
hostilities would be that of the taxi drivers of the Marne who, in 1914, 
ferried troops and equipment to the front to protect Paris. A more 
general example would be the levee en masse . 
Paragraph 4 details the second limb of the general protecticn, -protection 
against indirect attack, by prohibiting attack~9 which are general in 
their effect and which cannot distinguish between civilian and nilitary 
targets. These are termed "indiscriminate attacks 11 and include attacks 
that, while employing discriminating weaponry, are not directed at a 
specific mil itary ob jective. Likewise paragraph 4(b) prohibits the use 
of methods or means of combat that cannot be directed against a specific 
military objective, that are inherently indiscriminate. ParaGraph 4(c) 
plugs a gap by forbidding the employ~ent of methods or means of co~bat 
that, while they c an be aimed at a specific ob ;-j ective, have such a 
devastating effect that damage cannot be limited to the target within 
the degree acceptable to the Protocol . 
Paragraph 5 gives a non-exhaustive list of types of indiscriminate 
attack. The first of these is saturation or carpet bombing in which 
These c ases mainly speak to the situation of w~nton destruction 
committed in occupied territory as (alleged) reprisals. However 
the principles enunciated apply by analogy to terrorisation used as 
a method of combat. 
87. Article 50 (see Annex I) defines civilians negatively, that is to 
say they are all those not defined by Article 4A(1),(2),(3) and (6) 
of the Third Convention of Geneva, 1949 and by Article 43 of Protocol 
I. Stating it positively this means that a civilian is a person not 
belonging to any ar~ed force and who does not take part in hostilities. 
88. According to Article 49(2),(3) and (4), Protocol I (and hence Article 
51) applies to all attacks in whatever territory conducted. "Military 
operations" refers to attacks by land, and at"!;acks by air or sea 
against objectives on land. They do not otherwise affect the law 
applicable to aerial or naval warfare. Furthermore the battlefield 
Articles are additional, and not exclusive of, other relevant 
humanitarian rules of law. 
89. "Attack" is not used by Protocol I in its usual sense, that is to say 
it does not connote assault. By virtue of Article 49(1) an "attack" 
is any act of violence against the ene1:iy, re gardless of the phase 
of war. 
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whole towns are treated as one military objective and levelled so as 
to destroy several separate and distinct military targets located 
within the town. If this provision can be effective it will return 
the concept of military objective (so far as aerial warfare is concerned) 
to its pre-Second ~·Jorld War state as evidenced by Articles 24 and 25 
of the Hague Rules of Air Warfare?
0 
The provision also substantially modifies the Hague Regulations of 
1907 as they apply to land warfare by effectively abolishing the 
defended place test for justifying bombardments. Clearly attacks by 
ground forces must now be directed only against identified military 
targets within a town, it is no longer permissible to bombard generally 
in the expectation that the damage to civilians will assist the 
defenders in deciding to capitulate. 
Paragraph 5(b) labels as indiscd_riinn. te at t a cks \-1hich, although dire ctcd 
against a military objective, may be e xpected t o cause individual 
civilinn loss ''which would be excessive in relati on to the concrete and 
direct r:iilitary advantage anticipated." This is a proportionality 
test, a t est that mu s t be answered by the com~ander o f the attacking 
force(in the first instance - but often by politicians if the attack 
. t b . . t t t . 1 · ) 91 It . t h is ,o e a maJ or one in r esp onse ·o .s ra ep;ic p o J.cy • is · 1 us a 
subjective tect based on the appreciation of the a ttnck-authoriser. 
It is a test that is a cruc ial component of the protective structure 
erecced by the bat~lefield. Ar:·1,.i.cles, its efficacy wi:1...L be evaluated 
shortly. 
Incidental loss of civilian life as m0asure d against potential military 
advantage was a calculus included in Article 24(3) and (4) of the Hague 
Rules of Air WarL:_re. Those Rules Here more re s trictive than the 
present provision in that Article 24(3) prohibiten the boo bardment 
of towns not in ''the immediate neighbourhood of the operations of land 
02 
forces 11 ; where in the present case t he re i s no such 9rovision. However 
it might also be argued that the lla~ue Rules provision that towns 
could be bombarded if th e re exists 11 a reasonable presumption that the 
1nilitary concentration is sufficiently ioportant to justify such 
bombardment, having re gard to the danger thus caused to t he civilian 
· t · o 9} 1 . t . t' th .,.... .c. 1 . . t popula ion is ess r estric 1ve nan e rro~oco_ I provision hat 
90. L. Friedman (ed. ) supra note 4, I,L;..o-4L1-1 • 
91. 
92. 
93. 
See for c;-, ample hO\, tlte clec ision to attc,ck Dresden 
C. Webster a~d N. Frankla nd supra note, 73 , 54-109 
L. Fried2an (ed.) supra note 4, 440. 
Article 24 (4) i~id. 
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demands that the 11 concrete and dir e ct military advantage anticipated" 
must be greater than th e expe cted disadvantage to the civilian population. 
Arguably a less nebulous test·, but a moot point since the Hague Rules 
of Air Warfare were never adhered to anyway. 
The proportionality rule also represe nts an a.dvance over the Hague 
Regulations of 1907 since Article 26 (the relevant Hague Article) 
requires no such calculus. Once it is established that a place is 
defended incidental civilian loss is (subject to the li~ited provisions 
of Article 27) very much a matter for the conscience~ 
(i) Evaluation Of The Indiscriminate Attack Provisions. 
What practica l effect can the indiscriminate attack provisions have on the 
conduct of military operations? 
As far as aerial warfare is concerned the prohibition against carpet 
bombing, pRragraph 5(a),may well be effective because of the experience 
of the last world war in which it was shown that no worthwhile military 
advantage was gained by the practice, and indeed it may have been 
detrimental to the interests of the attacker. Further, the great 
technological advances made in weapons systewG means that precision 
bombing of great accuracy is possible , thus limiting incidental civilian 
losses. Against this however is the corresponding increase in anti-
aircraft capabilities. In an inte rview wi th a n American Navy pilot the 
writer learned . for exa~pJ.e, that the anti -aircraft defences around 
Hanoi were so effec tive that precision bombing Has alm ost inpossible. 
It is not likely that, in comparing expected civilian losses with 
a nticipated military gain (as required by paragraph 5(b)), an attack 
commander will consider the disconcerting effec tiveness of enemy anti-
aircraft fire as a factor requi ring him to abstain from attacking because 
of the resulting inaccuracy o f the bombing. 
The definitions contained in paragraph 4 have given rise to some controv-
ersy. Draper, for example, is concerned that they may be attenpting 
to obliquely prohibit the use of specific categories of conventional 
weaponry, something t ha t they could not do specifically~
4 
(At the 
Conference the question of prohibitng specific weaponry was g one into at 
some length, but no agreement could be reached):5 
"The ICRC, precluded from s pe cific limitations of :i.ndiscrinina.te 
types of weapons for vari ou s reas ons it cannot rcnove, has sought 
... in a series of detailed rules ••• to nrotect the civilian ponulation 
from mil itar• atta ck. If these ••• ruJes ar e to oncrate in ~',r,--~-..-----;..;_...._ ___ .:..;..:.,-~.;:..,,..~~;:....:.._.;;_:_::__;:....:;..:....::...::.......:.:;:....:.__;:..:.......::..~~:.;;_;_.:......::..::.:__ ______ _ 
raper, su~r a note 3~ , 
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armed conflict, then the weapon r estraints or prohibitions 
not established directly will have been brought into the law 
obliquely. This is a high expectation which, if it fails, will 
undermine the Rule of International Law in serious measure. 
Nevertheless it may be said that the attempt had to be made. 1196 
It is submitted that Draper's criticism has some merit. "Blind" 
weapons such a s booby-traps or land-mines do seem to fall foul of 
paragraph 4(b) or (c). However the delegations were not unawa re of this 
and in interpreting paragraph 4 they were of the opinion that it is not 
intended to signify that there are means and methods of combat the use 
of which would involve an indiscriminate attack in all circumstances. 
Instead they took the paragraph to mean that weapons c an , according 
to the circumstances of their employ~ant, be used legitimate ly or 
illegitimately?7 
In this way Draper's objection is largely avoided since states will not 
feel that they are prohibited from using conventional weaponry , all they 
will f ee l bound to do is consider the circumstance s of their use. 
Further 11unreality 11 Has avoided by the understandin g that Protocol I 
in no ,my limits, affects or applies tonucle;r \·!eapons~8 Not only ,ias 
this made plain during the Conference but was also included in declarations 
made by states on signing the Protocols?9 
This paper i s not concerned with the legitimacy or otherwis~ of nuclear 
warfare. It is submitted that in the event of nuclear Har it is not 
likely that any rule of 11 laH 11 will moderate the behaviour of the 
belligerents. In such a situation it is likely (unless one a ccepts 
the idea of a "limited" holocaust) that the fo undation o f t he law of 
war (the distinction between combatants and non-combatants) will be 
totally destroyed. In thi s respect the exclusion of nuclear ,·teapons 
95. 11 The indiffe rence or open hos tility of those states which possess 
the mos t advanced milita ry technology, including the Soviet Bloc 
and the majority of NATO, made it seem that any provisions that 
mi ght be drafted would not be accepted by those very states whose 
wea9ons were to be brought under control. A treaty binding the 
"ha ve-nots" but not the "have s 11 would be futile. And so the whole 
C.ilii1JWign ran down." R. Baxter supra note 6, 181, 
96. G. Draper supra note 33 , 12. 
97. Docunen t CDDH/215/Rev .1, 4L~. Stnte;:,en t of the United Kingdor.i 
Delegates. 
98. "'I'he United States c:.nd other countries r.:iade it clear that the new 
provis ions app lied only to conventional arms and not to nuclear 
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from the ambit of Protocol I adds to the re a lity of that document and 
does not detr a ct from its likely efficacy~OO 
The proportionality test of paragraph 5(b) was also criticised by some 
delegates. Mr Nguyen Van Huong of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam. 
considered that the subjective nature of the test made it possible for 
any attacker to justify his actions on the ground that his appreciation 
101 
of the situation favoured an attack. 
It is submitted that this is a valid observation, but not a valid criticism 
for it is difficult to see how any realistic objective criteria that 
would apply in all situations could have been laid down. \vhat the 
provision: does, and it is submitted that this is all it could 
realistically hope to do, is to raise the civilian factor in the mind 
of the attack commander so as to make him justify to himself his proposed 
course of action. If his decision to attack is manifestly inpro per 
then it is unlikely that the subjective nature of ~aragraph 5(b) would 
protect him in any subs equent judicial proceedings . 
Paragraph 5(b) is further limited in its effect by the interpretation of 
the phrase "concrete and direct r:iilitary advantage antj_cipated'' to mean 
11 the advantage anticipated from the .attack considered as a whole and 
not only from isolated or _particular parts of the attack.
11102 This 
means that the military advantage referred to is the strategic and not 
necessc,:..·i.:i..y ;.,he tactical oue. ':'~1at is to s a~, the b&tt:r 2c: n whole must 
be regarded and not just isolated part of it, a reservation that will 
allow actions that microcosmically appear to be unlawful but whi ch are 
justified by the broad strategic situation. 
99. 
100. 
101. 
102. 
weapons, and the I.C.R.C. itself now pr oceeded on t hese assumptions 
from the outset. The new Protocol I thus places no restraints 
whatsoever on use of nuclear weapons." R. Baxter sunra. note 6, 179. 
The United Kingdom signed Protocol I with the understanding: 
''··· that the new rules introduc ed by the Protocol are not intended 
to have any effect on and do not regulate or prohibit the use of 
nuclear weapons ••• " The United States of A...ieri ca sie;ned with the same 
understanding . l'i:inistry of Foreign Affa irs Document 108/11/27, 3. 
For in f ormation on this topic see: Shimada v. Japan (1963) 8 
Japanese Annual Of Int e rnational Law 212. G. Schwarzenberger 
The Le alit - Of Nuclea- \'Jea ons (London, 1958) 
1975 Document CDDH/III/S.R.13 to 1~0, 26. 
Understanding of the United Kingd om on signing Protocol I supra note 
99,2. The United States of America made the same re .servation 
which reflected th e feeling of the Conference. 
-28-
Article 51 was adop ted by 77 votes in favour, 16 abstentions and one 
against. The nation objecting to the Article was France which considered 
that it: 
''··· would seriously hamper the conduct of defensive military 
operations against an invader and prejudice the exercise of the 
inherent right of legitimate defence recognised in Article 51 of 
the Charter of the United Nations. As an exariple ••• it would be 
very difficult in many cases to estimate the limits of a 'specific 
military objective 1 ••• especia.lly in industrialized zones of 
large cities and in forestry zones which could serve as a cover to the 
stationing and movement of enemy forces, while being used as a shelter 
by the civilian population. 11103 
The French delegate considered that provisions concerning indiscriminate 
attacks could not prohibit a state fro ~;1 defending its territory, even 
if such de f ence might result in l os se r-5 to its o ,·m c ivilian ·population. 
Because of this the Article pla ced humanitarian princip les above reality 
10L~ 
and therefore it wa s objected to. 
Art i cle 51 is mor e co~p lex t h a n i t s c o unt e r part i n the Hague Regulatio ns 9 
perhaps reflecting the fact tha t wa r f are is now a much n ore complex 
buGiness , and if it h a s pla ced humanitaria n pri nc i ples above reality 
then its drafters h a ve failed in t h eir balancing process. As the 
French dele g ate pointe d ou t in a n urba n situa ti on a n army's militar y 
objectives wi ll s eld om be cle &rly s e par a te or- dist i nct, b ut will 1,t,is 
hamper military operations, eithe r defe n s ive or offensive? 
For example, suppos e a n infantry c ommander i s give n th e task of 
capturing a medium-s i zed town a nd d e ~ troying the e ne~y defending it. He 
knows that the town i s held in some force by a mixed armour/notorised 
infantry battle group which h a s h ci.d time to p r epare a good defensive 
position, but which iE like ly to a ttemp t o n ly a delayin~ defence. 
Intellig ence report s indicate tha t e a ch of th e three main approaches 
to the town is commanded by an enemy strongpoint situated within the 
environs of the town. The s e are h e ld by the bulk of t he ene my infantry. 
The loca ti on of th e ene my armour is uncertain , but it i s l ikely that it 
will be occup ying well-sited hu l l-down p o s itions from whi c h it can 
supp ort t h e strongpoint s . In t he u sual way a lt erna t i v e p o s itions , a nd 
the route c: beh1een t be:-:i Hill h a v e b een ,-1ell pr e ~a red. The infantry 
105 . (1977) Docw,1e nt CDDH/SR 3l1-_L~6, 162. 
104. Ibid, 
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commander now makes his appreciation of the situation and one of the 
factors that he knows he must consider is the fact that the entire 
civilian populati(:n is still in town. From his consideration of enemy 
strengths the infantry commander makes the following broad deductiorn: 
(1) The enemy infantry is concentrated in three main positions, there-
fore these mu.st be bombarded as heavily as possible prior to and during 
the attack. 
(2) The enemy's armour is unlocated, but in view of it .s likely actions 
th e bombardment of probable fire -positions (and th e routes beh:een them) 
will also be necessary; 
(3) The enemy will probably · try to withdraw before the attack is carried 
home, therefore checkpoint and rendezvous areas and withdrawal routes 
suitable for motorised infantry should be bombarded as the attack 
progresses. Further, a limitation to the aim of capturing the town is 
that the enemy defending it is to be destr·oyed, therefore his with-
drawa.l routes should be blocked if poss ible~ Here th e streets are narrow, 
the buildings high and brick-built, there fore bombardment aimed at 
blocking exit roads with rubble should be considered. 
There would naturally be a great deal ffio r e to the appreciation but the 
above is enough for this study. 'l'he comn.ander i s beg inning to realise 
that th e courses open to him are indicating that a substantial part 
of the town is likely to be flattened if the attack take s place with 
consequent severe loss of civilian life and property. Under the Hague 
Regulations of 1907 he wou~a nu~ need to hesitate as since the town is 
defended he would be entitled to bombard it at will, subject only to 
Article 27 regarding sparing hospitals and charitable institutions 
if possible. The commander now has to turn to consider Article 51 of 
Protocol I to decide whether it places any legal l imits on his proposed 
courses of action. He decides, correctly it is submitted, that it does 
not. 
At first g lance it appears that the three strongpoints constitute 
"clearly separated and distinct military objectives located in a 
••• town" for the purposes of Article 51(5)(a) and that the commander's 
proposed courses constitute a prohibited indiscriminate attack. However, 
a closer perusal of the tactical situatio n r eveals that the stronfpoints 
are in fact salient feature s of a co-ordina t ed defence sys tem. They 
are connected by coaununications and SUPt~ly routes and are supported by 
armour which in turn h as its own established pos itions and routes. 
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All these are legitimate ~ilitary targets and their bombardment is 
justified, even when it is not known for certain whe ther they are in 
fact occupied by the enemy. Military necessity dictates that this be 
so, and in the present situation the commander is justified in conclud-
ing that the three strongpoints are not clearly separated and distinct 
oilitary objectives and :in acting ac cordingly. 
It is reasonably certain, however, t hat the envisaged bo!'.:lbnrdment 
would cause a great deal of incidental civilian loss which eight make 
the attack indiscriminate under Article 51(5)(b). The commander 
therefore has to -we:igh this loss "in rela tion to the concrete and direct 
military advantage anticipated''• It is submitted that since there is 
no objective standard laid down this provision has very little meaning 
except in extreme cases and \·Jill not prevent the com,"?lander from 
carrying out a plan involving incidental civilian loss if he believes tha t 
plan to be the most feasible way of achieving his aim. The achievement 
of a commander' s t ac tical aim is the most concrete and direct nilitary 
advantage that a course of action c a n offer hio, and if the best way to 
achieve the aim involves incidental civilian loss then he will 
pr oba bly decide that th ~ l oss must be borne. 
In this case the co:m:iander may well decide to mini1:1ize civilian 
damage by not attempting to block th e enemy's escape route s with the 
rubble caused b y concentrated bomoard ,01ent , but th a t decision will be 
t t . d b . d 105 based on military grounds. He may not WRn · o impe e is 01n a vance, 
a flaclcing movement of infantry may be the best means of cutting off the 
enemy's e s cape or - most l i kely - the layout of the town does not lend 
itself to such action. Of course if the benefits to be gained from 
this s ort of bombardment are doubtful then the civilian loss factor 
may well be decisive in influencing the comman de r against it, but it 
will not be the primary factor. 
195. As happened for example in It a ly in 1944 in t~e attack on Monte Casino: 
11 The violence of the bombardr::icnt was fri ghtening: to behold even from a safe distanc e and, as events were soon to prove, it was too much and the d amage it did was more hindrance than help to the 6 Brigade Infa ntry fi~hting th eir arduous Hay through the ruins. To the tanks that ~-,ere sup:::,osed to be with them it was a ltoge ther too much, and moGt of t hem ended up facing impregnable mountains of rubble or vast u ncrossable chasms ." In this case too the majority of the p opulation was still in the t o~n . W.E. Murphy Official 
Histor• Of New Zealand In The Second World War 1939-45: 2nd 
New Zeal and Divisional Artillery (Wellington , 1 9 ) 5 9. 
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It is submitted that, in the light of tbe above discussion, the French 
delegate's fears were groundless. The proportionality rule and indis-
criminate attack provisions of Article 51 do not prohibit incidental 
civilian loss, they nerely require a calculation that balances that 
prospective loss against the military necessity of conducting an operation 
in the manner envisaged. In the above situation ( a fairly representative 
one in its context) Article 51 had no real effect on the amount of 
damage that the inhabitants of the town would suffer in such an 
attack. In vieH of the previous discussion on sovereignty and Bilitary 
necessity this is not surprising, the nations would not be likely to · 
agree to rule:;; that would hamper "ordinary" military operations. 
However what Article 51 has done in the above scenario is raise the issue 
of civilian loss. If the commander had contewplated attempting to 
block escape routes by the rubble of concentrated bombardment as a forlorn 
hope only, the proportionality rule might well cause him to stay his band. 
Even if it was a viable proposition, the fact that the civilian factor 
was established in his mind would cause him to look hard at possible 
alternatives. Much would depend on the ccpectations of conduct ir:iparted 
to him by training courses on the nature and effe ct of the Articles. 
In this respect the provisions of Article 51 represent a r calistiJ
06 
and _a 
valuable advance in the law of war. 
106. In a letter dated September 22, 1972 sent to Senator Edward Kennedy 
in response to his inquiry on war-related civilian problems in 
Indochina J. Fred Buzh2.rcl t, General Counsel of the Department of 
Defence, made remarks on the law and t h e rasponse of the U.S. f0-ceq 
to the law which, it is submitted, are still relevant following the 
drafting of Protocol I. 
11The existing laws of ar!".:ied conflict do not prohibit the use of 
weapons whose destructive force cannot be limited to a specific 
military objective. The use of such weapons is not proscribed when 
their use is necessarily required against a military target of 
sufficient importance to outweigh inevitable, but regrettable, 
incidental casualties to civilians and destruction of civilian 
objects. 11 
It is submitted that this statement does not conflict with the 
indiscrioinate attack provisions of Article 51 (4) given the 
interpretations of that Article to the effect that it does not 
outlaw s:peci:fic we aponry• 
Buzhardt then goes on to describe how this a ffected the U.S. forces 
in Indochina. 
11 The correct rule of international law which has applied in the pas t 
and continued to apply to the conduct of our ~ilitary operations 
in Southeast Asia is th a t 'the loss of life and damage to property 
must not be out of proportion to the military advantage to bo gainedt. 
A review, of the operating authorities and rules of engage~ents for 
all of our forces in Southeast Asia •.• r eveals that not only are 
such operations in confor~ity with this basic rule, but t hat in 
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ii Reprisals. 
Paragraph 6 of Article 51 bluntly prohibits reprisals against the 
civilian population or civilians, and similar prohih:Lt-ions in other 
Articles likewise forbid reprisals against civilian objects (Art.52(1)), 
cultural objects (Art.53(c)), objects indispensable to the survival 
of the civilian population (Art.54(4)), the natural environment 
(Art.55(2)), and works and in~tallatiotis containing dangerous forces 
(Art.56(4)). The net effect of these overlapping prohibitions is to 
totally ban the use of reprisals (in the course of hostilities) against 
the civilian interests protected by Protocol I. 
This represents a considerable change in the law as will now be discussed. 
As stated earlier the doctrine of reprisals was seen as a law-enforcing 
doctrine. It !}I)ermitted11107 a state to take a ction, apparently in 
breach of the law of war, against an enemy state whi ch had seriously 
violated the laws of war s o a s to compel the enemy state to cease the 
violations . 
However the reprising s t ate had first to warn th e tra nsgressor state 
and call on it to comply with the l aw , the r eprisive action had to be 
proportionate to the transgressor state ' s violations, end as soon as 
they ceased, and the de cis ion to take reprisals had to be made at the 
highest political leve1;
08 
After the Firs t World War the area of belligerent reprisals was split 
with Article 2 of the Geneva Convention of 1929 prohibi ti:ag reprisals 
1 09 against prisoners of war, a protection which was lat e r extended to 
all those covered by the four Geneva Conventions of 1949;
10 
The Hague 
Convention of 1954 took the question further by absolutely forbidding 
111 re prisals against cultural property. However until Protocol I they 
remained exta nt with regar~ to the law of comba t. 
addition, extensive constraints are i~posed to avoid if at all 
possible the infliction of casualties on non-co~batants and the 
destruction of pro : erty ot~e r than that related to the military 
09erations in carrying out military obje ct ives ." 
Thus in 1972 the United States already r egarded the proportionality 
principle as a 11 basic rule 11 of internation::l law and instructed their 
forces to act accordingly. (1973 ) 67A.J.I.L. 122, 124-125. 
107. 11 ••• while in the view of some authors like Kelsen r eprisals cons ti~ 
tute legitimate actions in execution of ru les of international law 
(unless they exceed cert ?in li~its and thereby become unlawful), 
ac c ording to a more widely accepted view they are a sort of substi-
tute for real act::; of e,:e cution and, as self -hel:9 , are ,:ierely 
justifiable (again on t he condition t~ at certain limits are not 
exceeded )." F. Kalshoven BelliET,eren t Re 1)risals (Le yden , 1971) 23. 
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What are the merits of this ne~·: ban? Firstly Protocol I is concerned Hith 
hWJJ.anitarian law and belligerent reprisals in coCTb a t 11 is precisely 
the field where recourse (to them) can ~e most damaging to human 
112 values". · The civilian interests protected by Protocol I would 
be innocent victims of reprisive actions: 
"••• it is a conspicuous feature of belligerent reprisals that 
these, even when technically aimed against the State, almost certainly 
will have their direct impact on individuals who, as likely as not, 
are innocent of the wrong provoking the reprisa1. 11113 
Opinion at the Conference polarised sharply over the question of 
reprisals, although in the finish the great majority of states agreed 
to the Articles containing the ban. Poland, for instance, ~,elcomed the 
prohibitions as a great advance in the protection of the civilian 
population, pointing out that of the six million Polish casualties 
of \~orld War Two the majority were civilians.
114 
France took the contrary view that the ban would mean that the enemy 
might violate the la1;1s of Har with irnpuni ty. 115 
The last point has some substa nce. Para~raph 8 of Ar ticle 51 provides 
that a ny violation of the Article 's prohib~ions by one side does not 
~elease the other Parties to the conflict fr om t~eir legal obligations. 
Yet if one side did breach their obligations t hen pressures Hould bui l d 
up for the other side to take reprisive measures with ·a consequential 
likelihood of the ban beiag violated, to the detri~ent of the law as 
a whol'9. 
11 1n some cases it will even be a virtual necessity for a belligerent 
to set aside the rule violated by its opp onent, as otherwise it would 
have to fight at an unacceptable disadvantage. 11116 
Against this is the realisatio~ by states that despite the existance 
of rule s of law persistent breaches of that l aw will be likely to 
induce retaliation in kind. Protocol I does not prohibit the threat of 
108. Ibid., 22-23. 
109. Ibid. , 80. 
110. Ibid., 265. 
111. Ibid., 275. 
112. Ibid., 375. 
113. Ibid. , L~2 
114. (1977) Document CDDR/SR. 34-46, 166. 
115. Ibid. , 162. 
116. F. Kalshoven The I,aw Of Warfare (Geneva, 1973 ) 108. 
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reprisi ve actions and this, coupled with the knm,,ledge that if 
provoked too far the state will carry out its threat, can continue to 
act is a deterrent. 
It can also be argued that a ban on reprisals in the course of 
hostilities is unrealistic because of the possibly greater military 
advantages to be gained from reprisals in this area than those where 
they are already banned by the Geneva Conventions of 1949. 
However Kalshoven in his survey of the practice of states in the Second 
World War can find no genuine acts of combat reprisals, and gives as 
a reason: 
''••• the limited importance in practice of belligerent reprisals. 
These are in fact virtually useless, for instance, in respect of an 
enemy who by his whole attitude demonstrates a total disrespect for 
certain parts of the law of war .• •• They are equally useless when 
applied in a situation where the interests at stake are so great 
as to make it utterly improbable that a belligerent would change 
his policy merely on account of a certain pressure exerted on him 
by the enemy: instances of such crucial issues were the strat~gic 
air bombardment and the unrestricted submarine warfare, practised 
by either side in the course of the Second World War. 11117 
He therefore concludes that a total prohibition of belligerent reprisals 
is a tenable proposition, but argues at some leng th that a prerequisite 
for the efficacy of such a step would be the institution of adequate 
means to take over their function of law enforcement;
18 
Section II of Part V of Protocol I contains seven Articles for the 
repression of breaches; 19 Article 85 makes the provisions of the 
Geneva Conventions of 1949 relating to the re pression of breaches and 
grave breaches applicable to Protocol I. These Conventions lay a strict 
obligation on the states "to enact any legislation necessary to provide 
effective penal sanctions for persons coamitting , or ordering to be 
committed, any of the grave brea ches 11 defined in each of the Conventions. 
The states are also under an obligation to bring to justice "persons 
alleged'to have committed, or to have ordered to be committed, such 
120 grave breaches." 
117. F. Kalshoven supra note 107, 214. 
118. Ibid., 375. 
119. Articles 85-91. See Annex I. 
120. Articles (in order of Convention) 49/50/129/146 supra note 5. 
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h ~ d th . . t b . . 121 b t . t . bl Kals oven roun ese provisions o e impressive, u i is argua e 
that it would be much more difficult to supervise the ban in this area 
(which after all deals with the actual process of war) than in the areas 
covered by the Conventions. Moreover reprisals are not characterised 
as being grave breaches of Protocol I. Article 85(3)(a) does define 
as a breach 11making the civilian po-pulation or individual civilians 
the object of attack", and since violent reprisals against civilians 
would be making them the object of attack it is arguable- that they are 
hereby covered. A similar argument could. be made with respect to Article 
85(4)(d) relating to cultural monum.ents,but.there are no similar provisions 
readily applicable to the other categories of civilian interests against 
which reprisals are forbidden~
22 
However reprisals will still be 
"breaches" of the Protocol. 
Article 87 requires that High Contracting Parties and Parties to the 
conflict shall require their ~ilitary commanders to enforce the Protocol, 
and this therefore includ es the prohibition against reprisals. Self-
policing in this o.anner would be most effe ctive, except where (as is 
often the case) the decision to reprise is taken at the highest 
political levels ~ 
Article 90 provides for the setting up of an International Fact-Finding 
Commission which shall be competent to enquire into alleged grave 
breaches (or other serious violations) and facilitate ''through its good 
offices, the v- c. s-l:: ~:::-ation o.f an attit::.c.a vf respect for the ·.'.,u.aventions 
and this Protocol. 11123 Rm.ever in other situations the Commission shall 
insitute an enquiry "only with the consent of the other Party or Parties 124 concerned". Given the nature of sovereignty in time of war and the 
tentative powers of the Commission it is doubtful whether it will make 
much of a regulatory impact. 
121. F. Kalshoven supra note 107, 270-271. 
122. Except perhaps for Article 85(3)(c) which characterises as a grave breach ''launching an attack against works or installations containing dangerous forces in the knowledge that such attack will cause excessiv& loss of life, injury to civilians or damag e to civilian objects, as defined in Article 57(2)(a)(iii)." 
But it would be open for any state t aking reprisive actions against such works or installations to argue that the expected civilian loss vias justified by the "concrete and direct military udvantage anticipated" (Art.57(2)(a)(iii)), i.e. the cessation of the oppooing Party's unlawful actions. 
123. Article 90 (2)(c)(ii). 
124. Article 90 (2)(d). 
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It is not certain what effect the reprisive provisions will have on the 
conduct of a war. Parties to a conflict will not be anxious to have their 
shortcomings exposed, and the probability that on the cessation of 
hostilities the victor will be likely to prosecute grave breaches of the 
Protocol as war-crimes is not calculated in itself to act as a great 
deterrent. Especially since reprisals are usually authorised by high 
authority for compelling reasons associated with the opposing Party 
having aJready violated the laws of war. 
However in one sense there is a greater strength of law in having a clear 
rule of prohibition. If the drafters h a d opted for a rule allowing 
reprisals of a limited effect or against limited objects there would 
be a great danger of them not being able to be so confined and a resultant 
spilling over into the protected categories to th e detriment of the law 
and humanity. The fact that some reprisals 1;1ould be lawful would lower 
the t hreshold of the law so a s to make such a 11spillage 11 a likely occur-
ance. Similar dangers migh t arise if the draft e rs had left the law 
alone. Re prisals are paradoxical in that they serve the c ause. of 
humanity by employing inhumane prac t ices, as a result they tend to 
degenerate into a downwa rd spira l of renrisal and counter-reprisal that 
may bottom in anarchy. 
In the opinion of the writer these arg uments~ and the ones advanced 
above, justify the ban on repris~ls in the cours e of hostilities. 
Hhether the ban will be st.rictly observed will depend, as all the !'111 es 
of war depend, on the nature of the c onflict and the expectations of the 
Parties to it. 
(iii) Using Civilians 'l'o Confer I ~nunity On l'1ilitary Objectives. 
Paragraph 7 of }.rticle 51 prohibits a Pa rty from ta.~ing advantage of 
the protection offered to civilians by using them to shield military 
targets. Here the reciprocity principle i-rnuld probably function 
to make this provision an effective one, for if civilians were used in 
this way the protect:il.e effect of th e Articles vrould s oon degenerate 
to the detriment o f both sides. 
At the Confe r ence some nations fear ed that this provision might hamper 
tbe national defence where populati on densities pre cluded the ~ovenent 
f
• 125 o . people from a combat zone. On the f ace of the paragraph this could 
not happen . It is framed in terns of intention, and does not contain 
any obliGation to mount a defence only in areas de void of habitation. 
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c.·Article 52 - General Protection Of Civilian Ob~ects • 
.Article 52 is the corr.plement of Article 51 in that whereas the latter 
protects the persons of the civilian population, the former protects 
its property. Paragraph 1 states that civilian objects shall not 
be the object of attack or reprisal.. In this respect its effect is 
more limited than Article 51's because here there ·is no obligation 
specifically fornulated to protect civilian objects from the incidental 
effects of military activity. 
Civilian objects are negatively defined as 11all objects which are not 
military objectives", the latter being defined in paragraph 2 as 
11 those objects which by their nature, - locatior:, purpose or use make 
an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial 
destruction, capture or neutralisation, in the circuQs tances ruling at 
the time, offers a definite military a dvantage.'' Paragraph 3 provides 
that if there is doubt as to whether a normally civilian object is being 
so used it will be presumed not to be used for mil itary pur~oses. 
That this Article extends the Hague Re gulations of 1907 is obvious~ 
There it was enough if an object was defended, under Article 52 not only 
must it be chfended; 27 it must also be making an effective contribution 
to military action and the curtailment of that action must offer a 
definite military advantage before it can be legitimately attacked. 
In introducing Article 52 to the Third Committee Mrs Bindschedler-Robert 
of the I .C .R .C. said that the purpose of the condition requiring a 
125. For example the Italian Delegation abstained fro~ voting on Article 
51 partly because of paragraph 7. In its explanation of vote the 
Italian delegation stated that its attitude to paragraph 7 was 
based on the following considerations: 
"The prohibition on the use of the presence or movements of the 
civilian population to shield ••. military objectives ••• 
presupposed that the State in question had large areas of uninhabited 
territory at its disposal. ••• (but) There were a large number of 
States whose territory was densely populated even near its frontiers. 
The provision could therefore in no case be interpreted as preventing 
or hindering a State that wished to do so from organizing an 
effective system of defence. That was a fundamental right which no 
Government could renounce." (1977) Document CDDH/SR. 34-46, 165 
126. Article 52(2). 
127. In the sense that if an object is making an effective contribution 
to military action it can be said to be "defended" for the purposes 
of the Hague Regulati ons 1907. 
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definite r::tilitary advant age before an object could be attacked was to 
introduce the principle that even a military objective should not be 
destroyed where such destruction presented no direct or immediate 
·1·t d t 128 mi i ary a van ~ge. 
It is difficult to see how the liquidation of an ob ject which is making 
an effective contribution to the enemy's military action would not offer 
an immediate and definite military advantage. It i s also difficult to 
see what sort of test would be used to determine whether an object 
being used by the enemy' s military forces is or is not making an effec~ 
tive contribution to his war effort. If it is left to an attack commander 
it is submitted that whenever a military objective is identified as making 
an effective contribution to the enemy's war effort it will be decided 
that there is an immediate definite military advantage in liquidating 
it. Of course this will depend on the resource s available to be 
employed against the objective, if resources ar e scarce then targe ts 
will be attacke d ac cording to a pri ority scale based on the magnitude 
of the military advantage to be gained from a target's liquidation. 
In thi s way a military objective ma.y be left alone for a, time, 
the reason of principle advanced by Mrs Bindsche dler-Robert. 
, L • on,, not l'or 
Opinion in the Third Committee was divided over the ~tent to which 
civilian objects should be i mmune . Some delegates wanted n blanket 
immunity for all civilian objects regardless of their use~ 29 a require-
ment thought (correctly it is submitted ) by others to be manifestly 
unrealistic. The delegate of the Democratic Repu blic of Viet-Nam 
argued strongly for blanket immunit}30 on the ~round that it would 
otherwise be too easy for an attacker to justify vmnton destruction of 
civilian objects by the assertion that they had been used for military 
purposes. A more moderate argument was advanced by the Swedish delegate 
who considered that blanket immunityvas necessary in orde r to check the 
tendency to broaden the notion o f mili tary object i ve~ 31 a broadening 
that had in the Second World War almost destroyed the distinction between 
civilian objects and military objectives . 
As has been discussed in relation to thB protection of th e civilian 
popul~tion the argument of the Vietnamese delegate has its merits in 
t hat an aggr essor c e n excuse unlawful actions b y re fe rring to broad 
128 . (1975) Docunent CDDH/III/SR. 13-40, 16. 
129 . Ibid., 27. 
130 . Ibid., 26. 
131. Ibid., 29. 
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subjective rules of law. However, in the area of armed conflict law 
the sovereignty of states cannot be too restricted in the name of human-
ity, it is just not practically possible. It is often better to have 
widely framed rules of law than no rules at all. A blanket imr::unity 
for civilian objects regardless of use would inevitably be disre~arded 
as soon as it became militarily necessary to do so. 
The same arguments apply to the points raised by the Swedish delegate, 
the parameters of acceptable conduc t must be placed realistically if 
they are to regulate the activities of combatants. 
There was also controversy regarding paragraph 3's presumption of 
harmlessness. On the one side were those who wanted blanket immunity 
and on the other were those, such as Mr Reed of the U.S.A., who 
considered that 11 a soldier risking his life on the battlefield could 
not be expected to take a decision in the c i rcumstances of the moment, 
and grant a presumption in favour of doubtful objects ••• 11132 
In the opinion of the writer the crea tion of presumptions such as this are 
wilitarily unreal for the reason that a field commander who is uncertain 
of the hostility of an object such as a church or a school o ften cannot 
af ford to act on a presumption of its neutr ali t y. The consequences of 
the presumption proving unfounded could be too great to be risked. 
Returning to the attack scenario; in considering the foctor of ground 
the commander realises that the steeple of a large church would m~ce 
a very good observation post from which defending artillery fire 
might, with disconcerting effect, be directed on his attacking forces. 
He does not knoH whether the church is being used in this manner, there 
are other prominent features that the enemy could use. In keeping with 
Article 52(3) he should therefore presume that the church is neutral and 
so leave it alone. However if the steeple is occupied he knows that 
his casualties will be~evere, his chances of fulfilling his aim reduced. 
He feels that he c annot ignore this p ossibility and ~arks the steeple 
down as a pre-attack artillery target~ 33 The generality of the 
presumption is such that in many cases it will inevitably be ignored. 
132. I bid. , 25 
133. In an interview with a senior New Zealand Army Officer the writer 
was told that it was this of f icer's practice, when a Company 
Commander in Italy in 1944, to "knock the top off every steeple I 
come across'' for the reason that they could not be presumed to be 
neutral as it would be too costly to be wrong . This practice 
appe a rs to have been common: 
"Pinally there was the church tower in Or sogna, the thin spire which 
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Military action, though it may be guided by legal principles will not 
be subordinated to them. 
!!• Article 53 - Protection Of Cultura l Objects And Places Of Worshiu. 
Art i cle 53 prohibits any acts of hostility dire c'ted against "the historic 
monuments, works of art or places of worship \:hich cons titute the 
cultural or spiritual heritage of peoples''· It is also forbidden ~ to 
use such objects in support of the military effort or to reprise against 
them . 
This is an obvious advance over Article 27 of th e Hague Regulations of 
1907 which merely provided: 
"In sieges and bombardments all necessary steps must be taken to 
spa re, as far as possible, buildings dedicated to religion, art, 
science, or charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals, 
I 
and places where the sick and wounded are colle cted, provided the y 
134 are not being used at the time for military purposes ." 
Article 53 is expressed to be "without :prejuuice 11 to the provisions 
of the Hague Convention for the Pro t oection of Cultural Pr o~erty in t he 
Event of Armed Conflict of 14 May, 195435 and it appears that it expresses 
stricter obligations than even this Convent ion. 
Paragraph 1 of Article 4 of the Convention states! 
11 The High Contracting Parties undertake to respect cultural p roper ty 
situated within their own territory as well as within the territory 
of other High Contracting Parties by refraining from any use of the 
seemed to gaze with cold, all-seeing eyes on the whole a rea. It 
survived countle ss thousands. of shells Hhich fell in the town and 
many hundreds of bombs ••• On the 12th (January , 1944) after an 
air r a id in which many bombs fell in the middle of Orsogna, the 
CRA c ttlled down a pinpoint concentration - a 'Murder' - by five 
regiments, each firing five round s gun fire, at the church tower." 
W.E. Mur phy supra note, 545-546. 
The tePor of the above paragraphs mu s t be qualified by the observa-
tion tha t in Ita ly it ~,;as quite common for the steeples to in fact 
contain enemy pos ts. It wns in this light that they were attacked. 
If neither side had ever used them perhapG neither side would think 
them worth shelling. A e; oo d example of the need to cre c te similar 
expe ctatio~s of conduct in the mi nd s of belligerents as a means 
of promoting the laws of war. Incidentally t he Orsogna steeple 
remained intact afte r the 1murder' shoot described a bove. 
134. J.B. Scott (ed.), supra note 4, 11 9 . 
135. (1956 ) 249 U. N. Tre a ty Series 216. The Convention was th e result of 
a Conference convene d by U.N.E.S.c.o. 
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property and its immediate surroundings or of the appliances in 
use for its protection for p urposes which are likely to expose it to 
destruction or damage in the event of armed conflict; and by 
refraining from any act of hostility directed against such property.
11136 
This seems to be a rather more comprehensive cons tr u ction of the meaning 
of Article 53, but paragraph 2 of Article 4 contains a proviso. 
"The obligations mentioned in parae;raph 1 of the present Article may 
be waived only in cas e s where military necessi ty imperatively require s 
1-z7 
such a waiver". :J 
This is not a very wide exception, but it will be up to the commander 
of the moment to decide what is "im;)e r atively n e cessary" and so by 
avoiding an absolute ban the Convention has real i stically accounted 
for military neceasity, something which has not been done by Article 53 . 
However, it appears that the drafters of Pr otocol I did not expe ct Article 
53 to remain unviola t ed and tacitly admitted that i t would be 
unrealistic to punish e v e ry transgression to the same e xtent. Article 
85(d) makes an attack on a n Article 53 ooject a gra ve breach o f th e 
Protocol only where t he re i s no evidence of the enemy having us ed 
it for oili tary purp os es and where such an ob,ie et is not located in the 
immedia te proximity of mili ta.ry objecti.ves ;
38 
It .i.G the opinion of t 'i.e ·-eri t er that th0 ·19.54 Convention -p:raviso 
is the better way of admi tting to mili t ary reali ty . By making an 
a bsolute prohibition comba tants will commit breaches of the Protocol 
where they have no other choice, and this will bring the la\v into dis-
repute. 
The example of the church given above i s relevant here. So long as the 
prohibition against making military use of Article 53 objects is adhered 
to, and knm·m to be adhered to, the Article could well achieve its pur-
pose since attack would be a wanton act militarily unjustified. However, 
where such a n object is being used for a r.i.ilitG.ry nurp ose , or where t he re 
is doubt as to its use, t h en it is submit ted t hat the c onsiderations 
136. Article 4(1) ibid., 245. Paragr aph 4 prohibi ts r e prisals against 
cultura l obj e cts. 
137. Ibid. 
138. Article 85(4)(d). See Annex I. 
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discussed above in relation to Article 52(3) mus t also apply. The 
Com:nander's decision to destroy the church stee0le would not be affected 
by the fact that the church was a gem-like example of fourteenth 
century craftsmanship. His decision would be based on a military 
appreciation of the tactical situation and trite though it may sound, 
the lives of his troops would weigh more heavily in that a ppreciation 
than would considerations of art and architecture. 
Against this may be cited an .American Operations Order f or the war 
in Laos and Cambodia for the attention of the Air Force139 in which 
it was stated: 
"Except during Si,R (Search And Rescue) operations, no US air strikes 
will be made within 1,000 meters of any of the a reas of cultural 
value (nearly 100others, in addition to Angkor Wat. sites were 
specifically listed in the directive)1 40 
This orde r represent s a conscious poliiical decision made in the 
circumstances of the time. Note that it is fr a~ed to comply to Article 
4 of th e Hague Convention of 1954, note too that th e prohibi tion does n ot 
apply vhen American personnel are likely t6be adversely a ffected 
(SAR proviso). This would seem to be a nice co::1promise be h1een 
military necessity and li.umani t arian lm·; , pr obably lawful under the 
1954 rules probably not under those of 1977. 
Similar criticisms may be directed at the prohibition against using 
Article 53 objects "in support of the military effort". If such an 
objec~'s location makes it militarily significant it is unlikely to be 
i g nored. If, for example, an historic oonurnent occupies a prominent 
feature that is to ,,be included in a defens ive syst"1:n then it will, of 
necessity, be incorporated into that sys tem. It 1~ay even be demolished 
(surely an ''act of h os'tilityt.J under Ar ticle 53(a)) if it i repedes fields 
of fir~ or if defensive constructions require it. In any event the 
attacking forces would be hardly likely to spare that sector of the 
defence from attack because of the cultural object~ presence. 
In the opinion of the writer Article 53 r aises a principle that should 
be considered by belligerents, but which will not serve to limit military 
ac tivity in a si tua tion where necessity r e quires it to be set aside. 
139 . 7th Air Force OperationG Or c er 71-17 ( Rules of Eneaf>ement) 
1 L1-o. Ibid. 
Since this is so the Article should not have incor:porated an absolute 
prohibition, it should instead have ins tituted the narrow exception 
of the 1954 Convention (if it wished to em~hasise - a special protection) 
or it should have required the same sort of calculus as appears in 
Article 52(2). In this way the principle would still be raised in the 
attack commander's mind, but his decision to attack would not be 
absolutely contrary to a provision of international law, to the 
diminution of that law. 
E. Article 54 - Prqtection Of Objects I_nd_isnensable 'ro The Survival 
Of The Civilian Population. 
Article 54 protects objects indispe nsable to the survival of the 
civilian p opulation such as the means and supplies of sustenance, 
including irrigation works and drinl~ing water installations. The 
protection applies only, subject to a proviso, when the destruction 
would be for the specific purpose of denying the said obj e cts for 
their sustenance value to the civilian population. The protection does 
not apply if the adverse party is using the sustencance solely 
for his own armed forces, or if not as sustenance then in direct support 
of military action. However th ere is a proviso that even if the adverse 
party is using those obj ec ts for such purposes no action sha.11 b_e 
taken against the objects that would leave the civilian p opulation 
without adequate food or water. However, as re gards national 
territory under a Party's O'.ffi control, the prohibitions shall not 
apply if the defc r•,;e of that te:::-ri t-ory i"l"cl.X:P.r, it imperative that tJ:I"::, 
be disregarded. Thus it is open for a state to practise a 11scorched-
earth11 policy on its national territory. 
One of the purposes of Article 54 is to pre vent the creation and move-
141 
ment of refugees by ensuring that they r etain the wherewithal for 
survival at their home locations. 
Damage incidental to civilian food s ources as a result of military 
operations is not prohibited (though the proportionality calculus of 
Article 52 would still apply) so the conduct of military operations would 
be unfettered (subject to the proviso of Article 54(3)(b)) in the 
usual situation. 
However, this proviso i s stated in such a bsolute terms that many dele~ates 
were worried about its effect. They argued that foodstuffs intended 
solely for military consum~ti on should not be entit led to any degree of 
protection. Neither should they be prote cted i f they were beinR used 
141. (1975 ) Document CDDH/~I1 SR . 13-40 , 41. 
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1 L~2 as a shield or as cover from observation. The proviso, it was 
argued, encouraged combatants to seek protection under provisions 
designed to protect civilians. Further 1 the prohibition was so 
absolute that it could be taken to include destruction incidental 
to military operations, an unrealist ic provision. I nstead they urged 
the inclusion· of a provision that danage must not be disproportionate 
143 to the military advantage sought. 
In reply it was argued that the proviso was strong beca use the prind:ple 
at stake here is vital. It was no use allowing foodstuffs intended 
solely for military consumption to be destroyed in all cases because 
that would only result in the soldiers taking the civilians' food-
stuffs. The practice of war is tha t the soldiers always eat first, and 
the civilians take what is left144 
The application of .Article 44 \·rill va ry according to the type of war 
being fought. In a g uerilla~type conflict it has been considered that 
a v a lid method of warfare is to deny the guerilla his supplies by 
destroying them, even if this means incidental civilian suffering. 
However the experience in Viet Nam has shown that such an operation is 
enormously expensive and not particularly effective. The only way to 
re a lly win a guerilla war is to gain the support of the civilian 
population,.and such practices are more calculated to breed guerilla 
recruits than a nything else. Hence the American 11hearts-and-minds 11 
ca~raign in Viet Nao , I~ ~ht: respect it is sub~itt_J that the 
Article may be effective. The parame t e r s have been realistically 
145 placed. 
142. 
1 L1-3. 
14L~. 
145. 
Ibid., 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
A practice initiated by naval powers throughout history is to 
blockade the enecy's coast s , allowing no shipping in or out and 
thus cutting off foreign (ove r seas ) trade. Since Article 54 
prohibits starvation as a method of wa rfa re can this practice 
lawfully continue when the seized ioods are badly needed foodstuffs? 
Exce p t in very extreme situations it i5 sub~itted that the practice 
may still continue. In the last two World '.fans blockading 
resulted in hardships , but not starvation, and there is no obligation 
on Parties to ensure that the enemy's civilian p opulation is well-
fed, it is only prohibited to e :;":ploy starvation as a method of 
warfare. Hu~.er incidental to a policy of blockade would arguably 
not be a breach of Article 54. 
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The situation changes when a vital food e ource i s being used to screen 
milita ry o~erations. If a patrol receives fire from n rice paddy t hat 
constitutes a village 's main source of winter sustenance the pa trol 
commander is hardly likely to refrain (because of this) fron calling 
in support fire that will incidentally obliterate the rice. 
Paragraph 5 permits the scorched earth method of defence, but only 
on one's own 11national territory". The i mp lied prohibition against 
scorching the eneny' s earth during a retreat fro'~ occupied territory 
is hardly likely to be effective if one intends to continue the policy 
on one's own territory. 
Article 9+, it is submitted, allows combatants cons iderable freedom of 
action and absolutely prohibits conduct that woul d probably be 
considered improper by the combatan ts i n any event. Evide n ce of the 
freedom of action conferred is supplied by the phrase 11 objects 
indispensable to the surviva l of the civilian population" '• 
In the opinion of the Australian delegate the word 11indispensable 11 used 
i n this contex t meant that the only obje ct s protected were those the 
destruct ion of ,...-hich would lead to the non-survival of the civilian 
p opulation~
46 
ThuG th~ mere placing in jeop~rdy of the civilian 
p o pulat i on is not enough to invoke the ~rt icle 5~ protection . 
F. Ar ticle 55 - Pro t ec tion Of The Natural Environment. 
Ar·~icle 9~ is complemented by Article ~7 which prohibi ts the use of 
methods or means of warfare which migt t danage the natural environment 
in such a way as to prejudice the health or survival of the population. 
This is a provision that is tot a lly new to codified law and it was 
drafted largely in res p onse to the \videspread u se of cher:iicals in the 
Viet Nam war. · ~efoliants and herbicides in particular caused great 
damage and it was felt that a repitition of this should be avoided. 
It will probably be an acceptable restriction because, once again, 
it is an extreme ly expensive and not par ticularly ef fective type of 
warfare that carries with it ~r ave political implications in the sense 
of worldwide disapproval during the war, and an embittered ex-enemy 
after the war. 
G. Article 56 - Protection Of \fork And Installations Containinf!: 
Dangerous Forces. 
Article 56 protects works or installations (ma inly clams , dykes c.nd 
146. (1975) Docur,1en t CDDH/III/SR 1~5-40 , 43 . 
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nuclea.r generating st2.tions) \;hich con t a.in d::i.ngerous forces, even 
though they might otherwise be military objectives, if such attack 
could cause the release of the forces and consequent severe losses 
among the civilian population. Kilitary objectives located in the 
vicinity of such installations shall be immune if att a ck on them would 
likewise cause the forces to be released. 
Paragraph 2 adds the inevitable provisos. For a dai~ or dyke the 
special protection shall cease if it is used for other thani its 
normal function and in "regular, significant and direct support of 
military operations and if such attack is the only feasible way to 
14-7 terminate such support~. 
Thus theore~ically a darn that supplies power to munitions factories, 
orsearchlights defending a military objective, is not liable to be 
attacked for these reasons alone. It is onJ.y if the sup:?ort is "regular, 
significant and direct'', and no other feasible way exists of terminating 
the supp ort that an attack may legitima tely be launched. The argument 
miBht also be made that the normal function of a particular dam is to 
provide electricity, and that historica lly (i.e . since before the war) 
sorae of that power has been used to ma~e munitions. Therefore it is 
immune from attack beca use although the darn is contributing in a 
"regular, significant and direct" manner to military operations it 
is not being used 11 for other than its normal function" and its des--
truction would cause severe civil i a n losses. 
1 L1 ° 
Of course the provision is not intended to mean this, 
0 
it is intended 
to specifically apply the pro,ortionality rule to this situation and to 
also give military commanders uniformly reco gnised guidance on their 
responsibility to civilians when c arrying out attacks on these sorts 
f . 1 . t ' . t . 149 o mi 1 ary ooJeC ives. 
For a nuclear power station the special protection ceases only if it 
provides electric pmrnr in " re gular, significant and direct support 
of military operations and if such attack i s the only feasible way t o 
terminate such support 11 •
150 
147. Article 56(2)(a). 
148. (1977) Document CDDH/SR. L~2,6; (1975 ) Docuoent CDDII/215/Rev.1,24-25. 
1 l~9. Ibid. 
150. Article 56(2)(b). Thi:; formulation lends credibil ity to the 
interpretation that if a dao supplies electricity in such support of 
military ope r ations , it ir.ay lose its inr1:u11i t~r from attack. 
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P~ragraph 5 urges Parties to a conflic t to avoid locating military 
objectives in the vicinity of the protected works, but that never-
theless, if installations are provided solely to defend the crotected 
works then they shall not be attacked , provided that their armament is 
limited to weapons capable only of defending the protected works. 
Article 56 purports to narrow the c oncept of military objective by 
excluding from attack objects which might otherwise be prime military 
targets. However this is not done absolutely because such objects may 
still be attacked if the.proviso is fulfilled. While the words of the 
proviso are apparently objective ( 11regular, significant and direct 
support 11 ) the assessment of them will be subjective, an assessment that 
will be made by the party interested in attacking them. In such a 
situation the effect of Article 56 will probably consist of raiGing 
an awareness that the protected objects deserve special consideration. 
At the Conference it was emphasised that Article 56 1 s special protection 
is but one of several layers of protection becaus e Articles 51 and 52 
still apply; 51 
"If it can be at t acked under th:j. s A:cticle it is 1:,t:Lll subje c t to all 
releva nt rules; in particular, the dam, dyke et c could not be 
attacked if such attack would be likely to cause civilian losses 
152 
excessive in relation to th e anticipated military advaatage (Art.51). 11 
It was aLso stressed that because the special proteGtl0L ui these obj8cts 
was included because their destruction could be so catast~ophic the 
standard used in paragraph 2 { 11r ce;ular, significant and direct sup-port 11 ) 
was higher than that used in Article 52(2), that is 11 effective contri-
bution to military action. 11153 
It is submitted that no attack-authoriser would be concerned about 
semantic differences in protect ive standards when faced with a decision 
to attack an object especially pro t ected under Ar ticle 56. 154· 
151. (1975) Docu:i:e nt CDDJ/215/Rev.1. 
152. Ibid., 24. 
153. Ibid., 25. 
154. See for e xample t;1. e o.ccount of the decision naking process that 
led to the 11 dam-bus ters'' raid on the Nohne and Eder dams. C. Webste r 
and N. Frankland supra note 70, 269-292. 
And Kalshoven is s ceptical as to the efficccy of any atte8pt to 
protect nuclear p ower s t ationc bec~use of t ~ei r lar~e number and 
the increasing de pendence on their energy. F. Kalshoven 
"Reaffir mation And Development Of International Humanitarian 
Law APPlic ::i.ble In Armed Conflicts: The First Session Of The 
Diplo~~tic Confere nce, Geneva, 20 February - 29 !''.ar ch 1974 11 
{197y' :U .Y .I.L. 3, 1 ~:; . 
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For exa~ple, the standard in Article 56( 2) appears on its face to mean; 
that the protected objects are immune from attack unless they directly 
participate in hostilities in such a way as to be r 1significant 11 and 
11 direct 11 , and with such frequency as to charact erise the said support 
as "regular 11 • • Now, suppose in a conflict that e. detachment of anti-
tank missiles haa been located about a dam for the reason that the 
feature occupied by the dam offers the best position for the detachment 
to be able to repel an armoured thrust against a particular objective. 
The detachment has not yet fired so cannot be said to have been used 
in "regula r 11 support of nili tary oper ct tions. Since its effect is 
ouly potential it cannot be said to have been used in "significant 
and direct support'' of military operations. However under Article 
52(2) the missilest by their 11 .nature (and) pur.pose 11 do make such an 
effective contribution to military action that their attack would be 
justified. If &n attack commander reaches thi5 conclusion (ancl justifies 
it against Article 51) he will not be deterred by the theoretically 
hiGher standard of protection affor ded by Article 56 frorn attempting 
to neutralise the detachment wi th artillery fire before h e attacks, 
even though this will very lDcely damage or destroy the dam with 
re s ulting civilian loss. 
In fact Article 5 1 with its relevant and relatively simple proportionality 
te s t would probably be a more cogent factor in ~re serving an Article 56 
object than the "unreal" te st incorporated in Article 56 itaalf. 
A further problem in interpretation is raised by the paragraph 5 provision 
that purely defensive installations erected to protect Article 56 
objects are not themselves to be attacked provided they are not used 
offensively in hostilities anu provided that thei~ armament is liMited 
to weapons capable only of re pe lling hostile action directed against the 
protected objects . 
It is difficult to see w~at weapons can be said to have only a defensive 
function. All s 2all-arms and any lon~er range wea~ ons have an offensive 
p otential, and therefore their presence would deprive the defensive 
posit ion of the Article 56(5) immunity (although Article 56(2)(c) might 
still apply) • . A mine field would seern to corae closest to being a purely 
defensive Heapon, although its positioninp, could we ll mean that it is 
capable of more than just re pelling hostile a ction aeains t the protect ed 
object. It might, for example, .be pla ced in such a way tha t it alno 
blocks vit a l approach rout es to another purely military ob jective while 
ostensibly guardinG the protected ob:ect. 
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The wording of paragraph 5 also seemc to raise a contradiction in logic. 
It provides that the def~nsive installations shall not be made the 
object of an attack provided they do not partici~ate in hostilities 
other than in response to an attack. It appears that thi~ · means that 
a defensive installation shall not lose its immunity from attack for 
the reason that it has defended itself against attack. The ap~arent 
contradiction can be resolved by looking to practice. If a defensive 
installation is stu~bled upon by an enemy force ignorant of its status 
and an attack ensues, the repulsion of such an attac~c does not deprive 
the installation of its legal immunity. In such an instance, once the 
installation's status has been established it would not be attacked again. 
There would be no pointe 
Obviously, if this is not the correct interpretation of this part of the 
paragraph, it has no ',practical significance for the reason that if the 
first attack was delibera te and in·spite of the installation's status 
then the retention of its legal immunity would be irrelevant in that it 
would not prevent subsequent attacks. Its ~ractical im~unity 
desappeared with the fir st at tacJ~5 
In the opinion of the write~ the effect of Article 56 will be that objects 
such as dams, dykes and nuclear generating stations shnll not be the 
object of att a ck unles s there is sufficient military reason for 
attacking them that will justify the resulting darJage to civilians. 
wnat is a 11sufficient 11 military ree.son will pr obably not require the 
prote cted object to have demons trated _ its 11effectivett and "direct" 
capability for dama ging the enemy on more than one occasion. A perceived 
potential for such support will be "' 11suffic:i.ent 11 • 
And even this may be overstating the prote ction in sone instances. 
Take the situation of a dyke tbat is not a military objective at all in 
that it is not defended and is not providing any support for military 
operations. All it does is contain a lot of water tl1at, if released, 
would cause severe civiliun losses. Prima yfacie this dyke is granted 
imnunity from attack by Article 56, it is a protected object. But, 
developing the situation, s uppose a party hostile to the nation controlling 
the dyke resolves to raount a major attack and decides that the best Hay 
of securing a vulnerable fl a nk of its attackinfZ' force Hould be to 
flood the land adjacent to the flank by destroying t he dyke. 
155. -Article 85 3(c) makes launcbin5 an attack against Article 56 
Works in the knowledge that such attack will cause civilian loss 
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If this was indeed feasible a major military advantage would thereby be 
gained and it is difficult to conclude that the existence of Article 
56 would prevent such a move. Article 52(2) could justify such a move 
as here the dyke's nature is pro.viding an effective military contri-
bution, but, as was discussed above, Article 56 is supposed to confer 
a higher standard of protection than Article 52. 
It is submitted that the, drafting of Article 56 is so complex . 
that it could gi.ve rise to much ambiguity and uncertainty. Its avowed 
aim of providing a special degree of protection for particular objects has 
arguably resulted in a situation where the protection will be discredited 
by banning acts which military nece ssity ~ill r equire being taken. In 
the opinion of the writer Article 56 attempts to regulate too many com-
plex eventualities and so has cons tructe d a nehrnrk of unreal expectations. 
It woulc have been better to have dra ft ed a simple proportionality rule 
bidding comba tants to have a special re gard to the consequences of their 
actions when attacking such objectivese 
Similar comnents may be directed at Articles 53 1 54 and 55 which have 
j u s t be·en examined. What protection do th ey add to tha t nr ovided by 
Article 52? 
As has been i mplied, very little. All of them raise a special protection 
for specific objects which would a lso be protected by Article 52. In 
so far as they elaborate the conduct tha t is cons ide red internationally 
acceptable their provisions contribute usefully to the inter~retation 
of Article 52. However in so far as they then try to exceed the 
protection of Article 52 they run the risk of misj udging the balance 
required between necessity and hu8anity. It is considsred by the 
writer that this could result in th e di s credi ting of the provisions with 
a consequential lessenine of even t he Artj.cle 52 protection. 
rt. Article 57 - Precautions In Attack . 
Chapter L~ of Se ction 1 of Part 4 of Protocol I is entitled "Precautionary 
Neasures rf and is intended to ensure th a t Parti8s to a conflic.t take account 
of incidenta l or accidental damage to civilians or civilian objects in 
156 a n atteck . They tie together the n r e ceding battlefield Articles by 
providing planning considerations which are meant to ensure that 
that will be excessive to the ~ili tar y advantage to be gained a 
grave breach of the Pro tocol. 
1~6 . (1975) Document CDDH/III/SR. 13 -40, 87 . 
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attack planners will t ake proper cognizance of the principles incor-
porated in the Articles. This is an extre~ely i mportant task of the 
Articles for, as Kalshoven says: 
''••• what is needed is not a ruling t hat c a n be applied by an 
adjudicating body long after the event, but a standard for the 
assessment of contemplated actions prior to t heir being carried 
out."157 
Article 57 deals with the precautions that should be t aken by the 
initiate~ of an atta ck. They are responsible for (i) doing everything 
"feasible" to ensure that their targets are military objectives within 
the meaning of paragraph 2 of Article 52; (ii) taking all 11 feasible 11 
precautions when deciding the mechanisms of the atta ck to ensure the 
minimal incidental loss of civilian life and pro9erty; (iii) to not launch 
the attack if the proportionality rule would be brea ched; and (iv) 
any a ttack shall be "cancelled or sus pen ded" if it becomes ap parent that 
a ny of the a bove factors a p ply . Effective warning must be given o f the 
a ttack "unl ess circumsta nces do not per mit 11 , 158 and if a simila r military 
a dva ntage ea ~ be gained by attack ing s eve r a l mili t a r y ob j ectives, the 
objective a tta cked s hall be t he one l i kely to be leas t e xpe n s ive in 
civilian t e rms. 
Thus the Article h a s tv:o phas e s ; in one t h e c omma nd e r must make a n obj e c-_· 
tive .appreciation o f th e i dentity of hi s t a r ge t, whethe r or not he 
can give wa rning of the a tta c k , a nd t he b es t c h oice of method a nd mea ns 
o f attack. Subject ive ly he must con3ider the proporti onality rule and 
th h . f b . t . 159 e c oice o o J e e ives. 
Paragraph 2(b) rai s e s some pra ctical problems with its requirement 
that if it becomes apparent that the civilia n factors outweigh the 
military one then the attack mu s t be cancelled or suspended according ly. 
If the attack has not been l a unched no new cons i derations aris e , but 
where the r e alisation that the target being att a ck ed is not a 
militarily justified one occurs a fter t h e atta c k ha s alre a dy been launched 
then other tactical matt e r s may h a ve to be cons idered before the att~ck 
can be suspended. 
157. F. Kalsh oven The Law Of Warfa re (Geneva, 1973) 67. 
158. Articl e 57(2)(c): c.f. Article 2 6 o f t he Hague Re gula tions of 1 907. 
"The officer in com:nand of an a ttac k in:r force mus t, before 
coCTrnencing a bor:1b~rdment, exce -p t in cases o f o.ssault, do all 
in his power to wa rn the authori t i es." J. B. Scott (ed.) sunra note 4, 117. 
159. (1975) Document CDDH/III/SR.1 3-40, 87. 
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An attack is not an isolated military exercise confined to a defined geographical region in which one side acts aggressively, the other parrying defensively. It is a process, a complex stream of action and reaction the effects of which are widespread and not easily controlled. Take the hypothetical situation of a police station located on the outskirts of a refugee-crammed town. The station is defended (for whatever reason) by a platoon of infantry equipped with s~all-arms and portable anti-tank weapons. An anti-tank/anti-~ersonnel minefield strengthened with wire and other obstacles also screens the station. 
The commander of the hostile party's forces in that area misinterprets the presemce of the platoon and regards it as an outuost of a larger force which he believes to be occupying the town and which he considers could be intended to threaten the flank of his next movement. He therefore decides to capture the town and destroy the force he mistakenly believes is defending it. 
In his attack appreciation the commander takes note of the refugees but deduces .that the concrete and direct military advantage that he expects to gain by ca9turing the town outweighs the probable civilian loss. There are several salient features and routes ,-,i thin the town that he deduces would be likely to be occupied by a defending enemy and these, he decides, will have to be boCTbarded as the attack progress es. He can see no way in which he can effectively minimize civilian damage other than by !"~ wt ::-:..~ ting artillery fire: to these salient features. 
Accordingly a battalion of infantry supported by a troop of tanks is moved under cover of darkness to a wood t wo kilometres from the police station. There the infantry debus, assemble, and then move to a forming up place about L~OO metres from the station. The tanks move to one flank so that their attack will almost be at ri ght angles to that of the infantry. 
Ten minutes before first light Assault Pioneers who have gone in advance of the main body blow assault l anes in the minefield and the artillery battery in direct support o f the battalion begins to bombard the p latoon positions and other suspected strongnoir.ts. At first light the infantry move ov e r their start line and co -:nence their assault across the gently rolling , sparsely ,,ooded 400 metres of countryside separating them from the staticn . At a rate of advance of about 150 ne tr es in t hree minutes it will t ake t heo nearly eirht minutes to r2nch .the 
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minefield. The tanks are providing direct fire sup:!_Jort and will 
time their advance so as to arrive on target at the same ti~e as 
the info.ntry. 
One minute after first light the tank commander, because of his 
vehicle's superior optics ~stem discovers the true nature of the 
objective that they are attacking and radios this information back 
to the attack commander. This officer immediately realises that he 
is attacking a target that he would not have otherwise contemplated 
treating as a military objective and that, under Article 57(2)(b) he 
:should cancel or suspend the attack. Is there anything to stop him 
doing this? 
Taking the situation in isolation there is not. It is a straight-
forward matter of stopping the expenditure of resources on an objective 
that does not warrant it. But an attack cannot be viewed in isolation; 
it would be folly to ignore the reactions of the opposing par ty. 
As soon as the attack commenced the beleaguered platoon commander would 
have notified his superiors of the attack. Almost c ertainly he wouldhave 
regis tered defens ive fire t -::>.sk s on J.i'·ely aosenib 'y ar-:?L'1S and fo rmin o; 
up places (which probably include those actual ly being used by the 
attacking for ce) and he would request hi s supporting artillery to 
fire then . His superiors would t hen have to decide whether to with-
draw the platoon or reinforce i t. If they deduce t h e re as on for the 
attack (i.e. that the attackers would ~e hampered in their operations 
if the town was held in force) then they would probably op t to 
reinforce the platoon if that was possible. In a ny event they would 
be likely to react vigourously to what they would re gard as an enemy 
probe by moving troops to counter the threat, th ou gh they nay not 
necessarily invest the town. 
\·.;hether the platoon is withdrawn or not the attack-ers will be subjected 
to artillery fire and (depending on relative air-strengths) the 
opposing party might well despatch ground att~ck aircraft. If the 
attack is c ~ncelled the attackers will still sustain casualties 
as they withdraw, and as daylight~trengthern they may find themselves 
caught in the open executing an un~la nned manouvre and subject to 
intense artillery and air att Dck . Further, having withdrawn they may 
well find that as a result of their de ~onstration the onnosing party 
has reinforced the town. Ironically thi s would leave the attack 
commander facing the to.ct ical situation t l,a t nro"'1nted hi "'1 to ,,iakfi 
the attack in the first place, only now there would be no mistake as to 
the presence of enemy troop s in the a re a , or the reason for them 
being there. Thus he would beconfronted with the necessity of 
repeating the whole performance with considerably less chance of 
success and at a considerably greater cost. 
Against this there is the question of civilian loss if the attack 
proceeds. The attack commander could rationalise that the pre-dawn 
bombardment would already have inflicted the worst damage that the 
attack is likely to cause. The fir e plan perhaps could be ~ltered 
so as not to bombard the town as the attacking troops move in, depending 
of course on whether the opposing party reinforces or withdraws its 
platoon. 
Faced v,,ith these factors the attack commander is not lik ely to call 
off his attack, but will modify it s o a s to deal ~ith the new 
situation. Indeed he mi ght well be le gally justified in doing so 
since the fact of the a ttack so altered the tactical situation as 
to r e sult in there being a concrete and direct milita ry advantage 
in pursuing it that outweighs the civilian factors. 
The above scenario is manifestly artificial and was contrived to 
illustrate selecte d principles of warfa re that the writer believes 
to be relevant in the pre s ent context. There would be occasions \vhen 
an attack c ould be cancelled or suspe nd e d aft er it h a d been l a unched, 
esJ,idCially when the obj<H; '.;i..-c : .s unclefe ndeu. Hc.,ie,re_.. two practical 
points must be emphasised, the first is that an opposing party can 
be expected to respond vigourously to any a ggressive military action 
no matter what it be directed against (and no com~nnder will look 
very favourably at the probability of a withdrawal under fire); 
the second is that most attack s are preceded, and nearly all are 
accompanied·, by as an intense a supp orting fire from he a vy weapons 
as is possible. It is this fire, and not the physical taking 
p ossession of an ob j ective, that will result in the most damage to 
civilians. If an attack is called off after this bor.1bo.rdment has 
been commenced it will probably be too late to be of more than 
rhetoric~l benefit to the civilians concerned. 
The text of Article 57 represents a compro~i s e be tween t h os e dele gates 
who Hisbed the r equireme r..t::; t o b e ab .sol ut e and t hos ~ wh o s a.H that 
realism d c~ a nde d the inc ] u s i on o f t he ~r or ort ioi1ality ru l e. In this 
context it v.1as s tressed b y seve r a l d c lc;::2-tion.:, t ha t 11 fe o.s i ble" 
shows that tbe Article is not one of absolu t e oh liga tions, 
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but of precepts that should be followed if' and to the extent that, 
the particular circumstances . 160 That is to when it is permit . say 
practicable or practically . bl 161 possi e. 
The consideration process raised by Article 57 is a reali~tic one 
162 that a co~petent military planner should follow in any event. He 
will naturally ensure that his objective is a military one whoae 
liquidation is militarily attractive, and he will be likewise 
unwilling to attack a military objective that is not causing, and is 
net likely to cause, his forces any discowfort. To do otherwise 
·would be to waste men and equipment to no point. Ho0ever, in the 
opinion of the writer the formal inclusion in the planning Frocess 
of a consideration of the Articles as per Article 52(2)(a)(i) offers 
the civilian the fullest, and perhaps the most realistic, form of 
protection that he is likely to get. For, by forcing the planner 
to formally recognise the "civilian factor", a threshold is raised 
which will not be crossed unless the milita ry advantage to be gained 
by a course of ac tion contrary to the letter or spirit of the Articles 
is of more than casual attractiveness. The greater the cont empla ted 
"violation'' the higher will be the t l'. r esh old and therefore the greater 
the military advantage necessary to sanction the prooosed cours e 
of action. 
160. (1977) Docmnent CDDH/SR 42, 12 
161. (1975) Document CDDH/215/Rev, 1, 27 
162. The question arises as to Hho t akes t he decisions required by 
Frotocoi I, who applies the proportionality rule? In many 
instances operations will be planned at a very senior level and 
those who actually put them into effect will be following detailed 
orders. In the Second World War the decision to shell the 
Monastery at Honte Casino ·was taken by the General Staff, and 
questions of reprisals were considered at the highest political 
level. 
Of course the higher command cannot consider every detail, so 
to what level does the responsibility descend? 
On signing Protocol I Switzerland made the following declaration . 
"With regard to Article 57(2) Protocol I only those FC rsons over 
and above the ran..1<: of battalion cor.i..'":lander would be required to 
take the precautions listed in the Article. 11 Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs Docurnent 108/11/27 (1977), 5. 
It is not known to what extent th is repre se nts general opinion. 
Certainly belm1 this level soldiers are acting according to very 
detailed orders that usually lea ve little room for discrct~on. 
A batt a lion commander should have the re s o urces available to 
him to r,1ake the neces s2ry decisions, his subordinates would not. 
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It may be said that such protection is scant indeed, and so it is, 
yet military necessity on a battlefield is paramount and the most 
tha t humanitarian provisions can do is to endeavour to inculcate 
an awareness of themselves in the minds of the military planners 
so that they will be considered as much as the e xigencies of the 
situation allow. If Article 57 c a n achieve thi s then it will have made 
a useful contribution to the l aw of war. 
J• Article 58 - Precau tions Against The Effects Of Attacks. 
Article 58 deals with the other side of the Art~cle 57 situation. It 
refers to the Party a bout to be attacked and requires him (subject 
to Art. 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1 949 which prohibits 
the forcible transfer of p opulations ) to try to r emove the civilian 
population under his control away from military objectives, and in 
any event to endeavour to avoid locating military objectives within or 
near densely populated areaD and to do whatever else possible to 
protect the civilia n p opula tion under his control from the dangers 
re s ul t ing from military ope r a t ions ~ These are not abs olute requirements 
but statements of principle that should be adhered to; 63 
J'« . Articles 59 & 60 Non-Defended Localities i\nd Denilitarized Zones. 
Article 59 provides for the e stablishment of non-defended localities 
which are protected from atta ck. Such a locality may be declared in 
r 0 ~pect of any inhabit~a Jlace near or in a ~c~bat zone, which me?n~ 
in effect that it is open to the occupa tion of the adverse party. 
To warrant the status the locality must fulfil the following 
conditions: (i) it must be free o f the declarer's mobile military 
presence; (ii) any fixed military establishments oust be undefended; 
(iii) the authorities and the population must not com~i t acts of 
hostility, (iv) and no activities in support of military onerati ons 
shall be undertaken. 
A unilateral declaration by one Par)y can establish a locality's 
non-defe nde d status, and the adve r se Pa rty is bound to recognise it 
so long as the above conditions are fulfilled. In fact this is a 
det a iled version of Article 25 of the Hague Regulations of 1907 which 
forbids attacks on open loc a lities, The theory is tbat since they are 
open to the occupation of the oppo s in~ forces there is n o point in 
expending military energy az,ainst t hem . 
163. (1975) Document CDDH/215/Rev.1, 27. 
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The object of Article 59 is to confer absolute immunity on the civilian 
popula tion against accidental or indirect effe cts of atta.c!cs directed 
at military objectives;
64 
To do this it was necessary to remove a 
piece of territory from military calculations by ensuring that it 
contained no military objectives. The non-defended areas are limited 
to localities (cities and towns etc) and not zones because experience 
has shown that to do otherwise might lead to the forced transfer 
of the civilian population to assembly ca~ps to the detr±ment ·of 
their health and society, and because if zones extended beyond . 
locali-ties the adw.inistra tive difficulties would be ino great to . 
handle i~ an armed conflict; 65 
Article 60 provides for the establishment of demilitarized zones and 
is a direct result of aerial warfare pushing back the 11 front 11 to 
encompass the entire land area of an o~posing nation, To protect 
non-combatants this Article encourages Parties to agree to define areas 
as ndemilitarized 11 , areas in which neither po.rty Hill conduct 
military operations. Unlike the declaration of a locality's non-
defended status a den ilitarizcd zone cannot be established without 
express agreement betwe en the par t ies, though such agreement may be 
concluded before and during war. Article 60 lays down conditions 
which should be agreed u pon before a zone is given 11 deoilitarized 11 
status. They are virtually the same as those made mandatory in 
Article 59 for the establishment of a non-defended locality except· 
that in a demilitarized zone no activities connected wit~ the military 
effort are permissible. 
The purpose of Artible 60 is to preserve areas of a nation for the 
sake of their social, economic, cultural or scientific value and to 
spare inhabitants far behind the battle-lir.es from the effects of 
166 war. In many ways Article 60 is only an extension of Article 15 
of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 to the present situation . 
There are four main differences between the two cate g ories of · 
neutral areas with regard to the establishment o f their res p ective 
statuses, control over them, their oarking and the conditions 
whi ch they have to fulfil. Under the Hague Regulations of 1907 
a non-defended locality acquired tha t status as soon as the factual 
situation of "non-defence" cai'.'le into being. 
164. (1975) Docu~ent CDDH/III/SR. 13-40, 107, 
165. Ibid. 
166. Ibid. 
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That situation is now expressly det ,~iled by Art~le 59 which r rovides 
that any agreement between Parties as to non-defended status can 
onl y be declaratory. Article 60 however requires the agreement of the 
Parties as a constitutive factor in conferring protection. Because 
of this, and the stricter conditions that must necessarily apply 
if the system is to work, the marking and control of an Article 60 
zone nee~ to be more elaborate, whereas since non-defended localities 
would prima facie have to be recognised quickly as a conflict 
fluctuates rnarki~g and control would be optional and de'!)end upon the 
circumstances. 
Article 59 localities do not have the strict Article 60 requirement 
.that no activities connected with the military effort will be permitted. 
This is because Article 59 localities would quickly be passing into 
the hands of the adverse parties so a new set of circuMstances would 
apply. 
Many delegates raised practical ob jec tions to th ese Articles. Mr ':lolfe 
of Canada, with respect to Article 59, doubted if it could work since 
it is impossible to control the ebb and flow of battle so as to know 
which areas to decl a re undefended. Further, it would be diff~cult 
to imagine how a commander could r esis t the tempatation to stay in 
a locality j.n order to make use of the vast net•:rnr k of co:.,1:mnications 
in an urban centre and the many other facilities which could help hi~ 
in the defence of the region. 167 
In the Second World war both Paris and Rome were on occasions declared 
to be open cities and so were not attacked. However, as Mr Wolfe 
pointed out, the declarations were made while they were still occupied. 
He therefore proposed that the Article be amended to allow such a 
declaration to be made, which would permit orderly withdrawal of the 
defending forces. The amendment did not find favour with the majority 
of the delegates, possibly because of the fact that the law does not 
prevent the Paris/Rome situation from recurring. It is still open 
to a commander to make a declaration that he will not defend his 
present position and will withdraw by a. certain date. 
167. Ibid., 110. 
168. Ibid. , 115. 
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It was also argued that Article 59 was irrelevant since undefended 
status was conferred in any c a se by th e factual situation. 168 This 
is of course so, but by formalising the provision it will be accepted 
by combatants as a possibility to be expected and not to be necessarily 
regarded with suspicion. By formalising the deta il mistakes resulting 
in civilian loss may well be avoided. 
Whether Articles 59 and 60 will fulfil the hopes of the drafters in 
time of war is an open question. Much will depend on the type of 
conflict and the faith of the combatants in the a dverse Party's 
~redibility (the question of supervision). 
IV. THE LIKELY EFFECT OF 'l'HE BATTLEFIELD ARTICLES. 
A. Blurring The Combatant/Non-Combatant Distinction. 
The basic principle enunciated by Article 48 is that in order to ensure 
the protection of the civilian population the Parties to the conflict 
s hall at all times distinguish between the civilia n popu l a tion and 
combatants. Article 51 in particular gives effect to this statement 
of principle in the manner discussed above, and the other battlefield 
Articles also speak to t he d istinction with r ega.rd to civilia n objects 
a nd military objectives. If the distinction between comba tants and 
non-combatants is not maintained the n t he l a w o f war coun t s for very 
little, if it is impossible to identify a combat a nt, to tell him from 
a non-comba tant, t hen the ba ttlefield Artic]es c a n h uve ve ry little 169 e ffec:t , 
The rules of law that state the requirements that must be met by those 
who wish to be considered as legiti mate combata nts, entitled to claim 
prisoner of war status on capture are thus very important. A great deal 
of controversy was therefore aroused when Article 44 of Protocol I 
purported to extend combatant status to categories of belligerents 
who might not previously have been eligible for it. Before discussing 
Article 44 it is necessary to briefly consider the existing law. 
The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 first formalised the conditions 
for qualification for comba tant status. There were four basic re-
quirements to be met: (1) the belligerents had to be commanded by a 
p erson responsible for his subordinates; (2) they had to have a fixed 
distinctive emblem recognis able a t a d i stance; (3 ) they had to carry 
their arms openly; and (4) they had to conduct their operations in 
169. See ·R.Baxter supra note 6, 174. 
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d 170 accor ance with the laws and customs of war. 
At the Geneva Conference of 1949 the experiences of resistance fighters 
in the Second World War led to the inclusion in the Third (Prisoners 
of War) Convention of a provision entitling to prisoner of war treat-
ment"• •• members ••• of other organised resistance movements, belong-
ing to a Party to the conflict and operating in or outside their own 
territory, even if this territory is occupied ••• 11171 Such members of 
course still had to meet the above four requirements so it is doubtful 
whether this liberalised the law much. 172 
Aiticle 43 of Piotocol 1 173 provides that to be a combatant a 
belligerent must belong to the armed forces of a par-ty to the corif1ict, 
that is to say an organ:ised armed force under a command responsible· 
to that Party for the conduct of its subordinates. Such armed forces 
must have an internal disciplinary system which shall enforce com-
pliance with the rules of war. Thus two of the four Hague requirements 
must still be met. 
However Article 44(3) provides that although the protection of the 
civilian population obliges combatants to distinguish themselves from 
the civilian population while they are engaged in military operations , 
yet there are situations in armed conflicts where, owing to the nature 
of the conflict, a belligerent cannot always distinguish himself. But 
he shall: 
"••• retain his status as a combatant. ~rovided that, in such situations 
he carries his arms openly: 
(a) during each military engagement, and 
(b) during such time as he is visible to the adversary while he is 
engaged in a military deployment preceding the launching of an 
II 174 attack in which he is to participate. 
On its face this provision appears to limit the requirements that arms 
be carried openly and that visible emblems be worn. Unfortunately 
the terms used in (a) and (b) above are not defined so it is a matter 
of interpretation, as will be discussed shortly, what the extent of 
the limitation is. 
170. Article 1, J.B. Scott (ed.) supra note 4. 
171. Article 4 supra note 5. 
172. R.Baxter supra note 6, 175 . 
173. For the texts of Articles 43 and 44 see Annex I. 
174. Article 44(3). 
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Paragraph 4 states that a combatant who is captured while in breach 
of paragraph 3 shall forfeit his right to be a -prisoner of war, but 
he shall nevertheless be given treatment "equivalent in all respects" 
to that extended to prisoners of war. 
At first glance this also appears to limit the necessity for a 
belligerent wishing combatant status to display his arms openly and 
wear identifying emblems. 
Paragraph 5 states that any combatant "who falls into the power of an 
adverse Party while not engaged in an attack. or in a military ope·ration 
preparatory to an attack shall not forfeit his rights to be a combatant 
and a prisoner of war by virtue of his prior activities." 175 
'l'his appears to mean, when read with paragraph 3, that if a belligerent 
breaches the requirements of paragraph 3 so that if captured he 
would forfeit his prisoner of war status, but is not captured while 
he is acting in breach, but later, he does not lose his prisoner of 
war status by reason of his prior transgressions. 
Paragraph 7 states that Article 44 is not intended to encourage armies 
to discard their uniforms, a curious provision when read with paragraph 3. 
Why did this Article come to be adopted? The answer is rooted in 
politics. When the Geneva Conventions of 1949 were drafted the 
world community was relatively small and there i-1ere not many inde-
-i:10n<'l~-:.t "Third World .Sta"'"eP". That situa';ion ~}1anged rapidly anr1 
by the 1970s these nations had come to represent a very powerful 
force in international politics. Many of the group have experienced 
the turmoil of revolution, they have fou ght to break their colonial 
ties and so are extremely sympathetic to those "liberation" groups 
that are still fighting those ties. Thus when it came to drafting 
the rules of war applicable in international armed conflicts they 
used their influence to include in the definition of such conflicts: 
''••• armed conflicts in which peoples are fighting against colonial 
domination and alien occupation and a~ainst racist regimes in the 
exercise of their right of self-determination, ••• 
11176 
However most of those engaged in such hostilities necessarily are 
guerilla fighters and since they fight stealthily and do not necessarily 
carry arms openly they often do not qualify for prisoner of war status 
when captured. Therefore their actions can be treated by the capturing 
·175. Article 44(5). 
176. Article 1(4). See Annex I. 
-62-
Party as being offences against the civil law, and it c c3. n visit on the 
captives ,all the attendant consequences of that characterisation. 
Article 44 therefore recognises the right of a guerilla fighter to 
wage war and attempts to respond to the reality of the world sit-
uation by extending humanitarian law to accord him combatant status, 
and hence entitle him to prisoner of war status on capture. 
Unfortunately the crucial provisions of Article 44(3) are undefined 
and the differing interpretations immediately polarised the delegates 
to the Conference. In the final ballot, though the text of the Article 
was the result of much discussion and compromise, 21 states (including 
New Zealand) abstained from voting and Israel voted against it. 
The objections of the abstaining states are well summarised by the 
Israeli delegate Mrs Lapidoth. 177 
11 It was true that guerillas and irregular combatants deserved to be 
properly protected by humanitarian law, but Article (44), paragraph 
3, could be interpreted as allowing the comb a t a n t not to d i stinguish 
himself from the civilian population, which would expose the latter 
to serious risks and was contrary to the s pirit a nd to a fund-
cunental principle of huma nitaria n law. ·In the case of guerilla 
warfare it was particularly necessary for comba tants to dis tinguish 
themselves because t ha t wa s the only way i n wh ich t h e c i vilian 
178 population could be effectively prot e cted." 
Thus in future no civilia n would be safe, s inc e t h e regular comba t a nt 
in uniform .would no longer know wh o wa s the ene my and who was not. 
Vioreover, once combatants were fre e d 11 from the obligation to distin-
guish themselves from the civi lian p opulation t h e risk of terrorist 
a cts increased11179 especially as they could enjoy prisoner of wa r status. 
In the excitement of the debate many of the dele gates lost sight of 
the real purpose of Article 44 which is not to enable gueril l as, 
while combatants, to be camoflagued by the civilian popula tion. 
The Article is only concerned with th e treatment of comba t ants after 
they have been captured, and the treatment that they get depends on 
1 8 0 their behaviour before t hat capture. 
177. (1977) Docuoent CDDH/SR . 34-Li-6, 121. 
178. Ibid. 
179. Ibid. , 122. 
180. See the exnlanation of vote b y the New Ze a l a nd d e l egate (Prof-
essor ~iuentin-Baxter). Ibid., 131. And s ee t h e re p ort of 
Com.mi ttee ,-III on th_e t h ird session where i t was ma de clear that 
A~ticle 44 was not intend e d to protect t e rrorist§ wh o acted 
clande stinely to att a ck the civilia n n onu la tion. (1 9 76 l Document 
CDDH/236/Rev.1, para. 90 . 
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For paragraph 4 means that the combatant who breaches paragraph 3 does 
not get the status of a prisoner of war, only the treatment. This 
means that he may be tried and punished for not carrying arms openly 
h . d t 181 w en require o. 
However the divergence of opinion as to the meaning of paragraph 
3 means that it is arguable that the law is by no means clear. For 
example when signing Protocol I the United Kingdom stated that it 
will regard the word "deployment" in paragraph 3(b) (which requires 
arms to be displayed before an attack) as meaning "any movement 
towards a place from which an attack is to be launched. 11182 This 
obviously limits the guerilla considerably. 
183 . 184 185 On the other hand nations such as Nigeria 1 Algeria and Uganda 
expressed themselves as being in favour of a very restrictive in-
terpretation of Article 44 to the extent that Nigeria declared that: 
"The Government of Nigeria would not recognise any reservations 
by any Party to Protocol I in res pect of Article (44) • •• Those 
who voted against it ought to have a chan g e of heart, particularly 
since they were direc t ly responsible for th e intolerable situation 
which compelled fr e edom fi ghters to resort to a r med resist ance in 
defence of human dig nity and national libera tion . 111 86 
And Mr Armali (Observer for the Pale stine Liberation Organisation) 
made it quite clear that his organisation considered that: 
11 The requireoents in paragraphs 3(a) and (b) re g arding the open 
carriage of arms could only be interpreted in the most restrictive 
manner: the phrase :•during such time as he is visible to the ad-
versary 'must be . interpreted as meaning 'visible to the naked eye', •• 
Similarly the phrase 'while he is engaged in a military deployment 
preceding the launching of an attack'' could only mean imm.ediately 
before the attack, often coinciding with the actual beginning of the 
187 attack. 11 
In the opinion of the writer such conflicting statements mean that 
Article 44 cannot be regarded as expressing any concrete rule of 
181. Ibid., 123 per the Italian dele gate Mr Di Bernido; and see 
R. Baxter supra note 6, 176. 
182. Ministry of Foreign Affairs Document 108/11/27 (1978), 2. 
183. (1977) Document CDDH/SR. 34-46, 125. 
184. Ibid., 127. 
185. Ibid., 129. 
186. Ibid., 125; Algeria said much the s a ne. 
187. Ibid., 147 - 148. 
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international law and respectfully adopts the opinion of the Swiss 
delegate Mr Bindschedler: 
''··· the explanations of vote by the delegations which had spoken 
on that article made it clearly apparent that no unity of view 
existed concerning it. Everyone interpreted it as he thought fit ••• 
Thus, Article (44) was not a rule of law, since it lacked the 
precision of a legal standard; furthermore, it was subject to 
t . 11188 reserva ions. 
In the opinion of the writer, given the above s i tuation the distinction 
between combatants and non-combatants has not been blurred because 
of Article 44, most states will carry on as they did before the Article 
was drafted. It has not therefore rendered the battlefield Articles 
redundant, and if its proper nature was realised (that it is not 
intended to shield terrorists) it still would not do this. 
B. The Battlefield Articles And The New Zealand Army. 
Most of the points to be mentioned here have already been canvassed 
in more detail in the body of the pa p e r . This section will therefore 
confine itself to general re rearks. 
It is arguable that the battlefield Articles realistically (for the 
most part) balance military nece s sity against humanitarian re quire-
ments. Yet this does not mean, it is submitted, that the New Zealand 
Army will have to radically chang e ~t s training pblicies. This is 
becci~Se of the nature of t~e h~ticles as has been uiticussed. 
Despite an elaborate structure the Articles have few peremptory 
requirements, and none, it is contend ed, that will cause great changes 
in the conduct of combatants. The proportionality rule as expressed 
in relation to civilians by Article 5 1, to civilian objects by Article 
52 and to attacks in general by Article 57 will be obeyed by a com-
petent soldiex· in any event. In particular the process required by 
Article 57 is one that is basic, in a broa d sense, to the training 
of all soldiers. Objectives are select e d carefully on the basis of 
the military rewards that they offer, milita ry resources will be 
carefully husba nded and not exp ende d ne edl e s s ly. It is well under-
stood that the civilian population as s uch is not to be made the object 
of attack and neither are civilian ob j ects wh os e destruction does ' 
not offer some concrete oilitary advantage. As to the s p ecial 
protection of cultural objects (Article 5? ),obj e cts indispensable 
to the survival of the civilian popula tion (Article 54 ) , the natural 
environment (Article 55}, and work s and i ns tallations containing 
188. Ibid., 1 31. 
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dangerous forces; as has been submitted above these would in any 
event receive a protection commensurate with the military realities 
of the particular situation and it is difficult to see bow these 
Articles can change this. 
However Article 83 requires the High Contracting Parties to dis-
seminate the Conventions and Protocol I, in ti~e ·of peace as well as 
in time of war, so as to include the study thereof in their programmes 
f ·1·t · t t· 189 o mi i ary ins rue ion. 
This provision will be implemented by the Army as far as is possible 
given the resources available, 190 and in the opinion of the writer 
this is clearly necessary if the Articles are to have their full 
runeliorating effect. For the Articles fulfil a valuable function by 
providing a comprehensive list of priorities, to be considered by 
military planners, that are additional to the purely military ones 
and which could create mental thresholds that must be crossed before 
civilian damage is acceptable. If the Articles are widely taught 
these priorities will be in the minds of the military planners of 
the Parties to any future conflict (and Article 82 requires that legal 
advisers be available when necessary to a dvise militar:y cor.1.nanders) 
thus ensuring that hucanitarian considerations are not lightly disposed 
of. In other words similar expectations of conduct would be created 
in the minds of the belligerents which could alleviate the coarsening 
effect of prolonged war and generally promote the interests of 
non-c0mb&tanc..;. rt::chaps, given the natur~ of sovereignty in war-time 
as expressed by the term "military necessity", this is all that it is. 
possible for any battlefield code to achieve. 
189. See Annex I. 
190. See R. Baxter supra note 6, 183 for his discussion of what the Protocol should mean for the US forces. Sadly the New Zealand Armed Services just - do not have the resources to contemplate anything similar. 
PART I 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
ARTICLE I 
General principles and scope of application 
I. The High Contracting Parties undertake to respecl and to ensure 
respect for this Protocol in all circumstances. 
2. In cases not covered by this Protocol or by other international agree-
ments, civilians and combatants remain under the protection and authority of 
the principles of international law derived from established custom, from the 
principles of humanity and from the dictates of public conscience. 
3. This Protocol, which supplements the Geneva Conventions of 12 
August 1949 for the Protection of War Victims('), shall apply in the situations 
referred to in Article 2 common to those Convcnlions. 
4. The situations referred to in the preceding paragraph include armed 
conflicts in which peoples arc fighting against colonial domination and alien 
occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of lhei r right of self-
deterrnination, as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and the 
Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations 
and Co-operation among States in accord:rncc with the Charter of the United 
Nations. 
ARTICLE 2 
Definitions 
For the purposes of this Protocol: 
(a) "First Convention", "Second Convention", "Third Convention" and 
"Fourth Convention" mean, respectively, the Geneva Convention for 
the Amelioration of the Condilion or the Wounded and Sick in Armed 
Forces in the Field of 12 August 1949; the Geneva Convention for the 
Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick .ind Shipwrecked 
Members of Armed Forces at Sea of 12 August 1949; the Geneva 
Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of \Var of 12 August 
1949; the Geneva Convention relativG lo lhe Prot ect ion of Civilian 
Persons in Time of War of 12 Augusl 1949; "the Conventions" means 
the four (rc.:neva Convent.ions of 12 Augusc J 9l;~ 1ur the protection of 
war victims(l); 
(b) "rules of international law applicable in armed conflict" means the 
rules applicable in armed conflict set forth in international agreements to 
which the Parties to the conflict arc Par ti es and the generally recognized 
principles and rules of international Jaw which are applicable to armed 
conflict; 
(c) "Protecting Power" means a neutral or other State not a Party to the 
conflict which has been designated by a Party to the conflict and accepted 
by the adverse Party and has agreed to carry out the functions assigned 
to a Protecting Power under the Conventions and this Protocol; 
(d) "substitute" means an organization acting in place of a Protecting 
Power in accordance with Article 5. 
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ARTICLE 42 
Occupants of aircraft 
1. No person parachuting from an aircraft in distress shall be made the 
object of attack during his descent. 
2. Upon reaching the ground in territory controlled by an adverse Party, a 
person who has parachuted from an aircraft in distress shall be given an oppor-
tunity to surrender before being made the object of attack, unless it is apparent 
that he is engaging in a hostile act. 
3. Airborne troops are not protected by this Article. 
SECTION II 
COMBATANT AND PRISONER-OF-WAR STATUS 
ARTICLE 43 
Armed forces 
1. The armed forces of a Party to a conflict consist of all organized armed 
forces, groups and units which are under a command responsible to that Party 
for the conduct of its subordinates, even if that Party is represented by a 
government or an authority not recognized by an adverse Party. Such armed 
forces shall be subject to an internal disciplinary system which, inter alia, shall 
enforce compliance with the rules of international law applicable in armed 
conflict. 
2. Members of the armed forces ofa Party to a conflict (other than medical 
personnel and chaplain covered by Article 33 of the Third Convention) a1 , 
combatants, that i~ to say, they have the right to participate directly in 
hostilities. 
3. Whenever a Party to a conflict incorporates a paramilitary or armed la\/ 
enforcement agency into its armed forces it shall so notify the other Parties to 
the conflict. 
ARTICLE 44 
Combatants and prisoners of war 
1. Any combatant, as defined in Article 43, who falls into the power of an 
adverse Party shall be a prisoner of war. 
2. While all combatants are obliged to comply with the rules of ·nter 
national Jaw applicable in armed conflicts, violations of these rules shall not 
deprive a combatant of his right to be a combatant or, if he falls into the power 
of an adverse Party, of his right to be a prisoner of war, except as provided i1; 
paragraphs 3 and 4. 
3. In order to promote the protection of the civilian population from the 
effects of hostilities, combatants are obliged to distinguish themselves from the 
civilian population while they are engaged in an attack or in a military operation 
preparatory to an attack. Recognizing, however, that there are situations in 
armed conflicts where, owing to the nature of the hostilities an armed combatant 
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PART IV 
CIVILIAN POPULATION 
SECTION I 
GENERAL PROTECTION AGAINST EFFECTS OF HOSTIL!TIES 
CHAPTER I 
Basic Rule and Field of Application 
ARTICLE 48 
Basic rule 
In order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian population an · civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish betwee 
the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects an 
military objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations only agains military objectives. 
ARTICLE 49 
Definition of attacks and scope of application 
1. "Attacks" means acts of violence against the adversary, 
offence or in defence. 
2. The provisions of this Protocol with respect to attacks apply to all 
attacks in whatever territory conducted, including the national territoi /. belonging to a Party to the conflict but under the control of an adverse Party. 
3. The provisions of this Section apply to any land, air or sea warfar~· ' which may affect the civilian p opulation, individual civilians or civilian obje• · 
on land. They further apply to all attacks from the sea or from the air again~, ( .. objectives on land but do not otherwise affect the rules of international law , ~ applicable in armed conflict at sea or in the air. 
"''. 4. The provisions of this Section are additional to the rules concernin~~ ' :,, humanitarian protection contained in the Fourth Convention, particularly : , Part II thereof, and in other international agreements binding upon the Higr Contracting Piutic>~, 'lS well as to other rules of ;r,l;:rnational law reht;ilg 10 th<! • protection of civilians and civilian objects on land, at sea or in the air again £t .? 
the effects of hostilities. · · 
CHAPTER II 
Civilians and Cfrilian Population 
ARTICLE 50 
Definition of civilians and civilian population 
1. A civilian is any person who does not belong to one of the categories 01 
persons referred to in Article 4 A (!), (2), (3) and (6) of the Third Convent ion and in Article 43 of this Protocol. Jn case of doubt whether a person is a civilian. 
that person shall be considered to be a civilian. 
2. The civilian population comprises all persons who are civilians. 
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3. The presence within the civilian population of individuals who do not come within the definition of civilians does not deprive the population of its civilian character. 
ARTICLE 51 
Protedion of the civilian population 
1. The civilian population and individual civilians shall enjoy general protection against dangers arising from military operations. To give effect to this protection, the following rules, which are additional to other applicable rules of international law, shall be observed in all circumstances. 
2. The civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be the object of attack. Acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population are prohibited. 
3. Civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded by this Section, unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities. 
_4. Indiscriminate attacks are prohibited. Indiscriminate attacks are: 
(a) those which are not directed at a specific military objective; 
(b) those which employ a method or means of combat which cannot be directed at a specific military objective; or 
(c) those which employ a method or means of combat the effects of which cannot be limited as required by this Protocol; 
and consequently, in each such case, are of a nature to strike military objectives and civilians or civilian objects without distinction. 
5. Among others, the following types of attacks an: to be considered as indiscriminate: 
(a) an attack by bombardment by any methods or means which treats as a single military objective a number of clearly separated and distinct military objectives located in a city, town, village or other area containing a similar concentration of civilians or civilian objects; and 
(b) an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. 
6. Attacks against the civilian population or civilians by way of reprisals are prohibited. 
7. The presence or movements of the civilian population or individual civi!ians shall not be used to render certain points or areas immune from military operations, in particular in attempts to shield military objectives from attacks or to shield, favour or impede military operations. The Parties to the conflict shall not direct the movement of the civilian population or individual civilians in order to attempt to shield military objectives from attacks or to shield military operations. 
8. Any violation of these prohibitions shall not release the Parties to the conflict from their legal obligations with respect to the civilian population and civilians, including the obligation to take the precautionary measures provided 
for in Article 57. 
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CHAPTER !ff 
Civilian Objects 
ARTICLE 52 
General protection of civilian objects 
1. Civilian objects shall not be the object of attack or of reprisals. Civilian 
objects are all objects which are not military objectives as defined in paragraph 2. 
2. Attacks shall be limited strictly to military objectives. In so far as objer. 
are concerned, military objectives are limited to those objects which by thei 
nature, location, purpose or use make an eliective contribution to military action 
and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralisation, in the circum~ 
stances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage. 
· 3. In case of doubt whether an object which is normally dedicated to civilia 
purposes, such as a place of worship, a house or other dwelling ·or a school, i 
being used to make an effective contribution to military action, it shall b 
presumed not to be so used. 
ARTICLE 53 
Protection of cultural objects and of places of worship 
Without prejudice to the provision s of the Hague Convention for the Protectio , ~ 
of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Confiict of 14 May 1954, and o :'' · 
other relevant international instruments, it is prohibited: 
(a) to commit any acts of hostility directed against the historic monuments 
works of art or places of worship which constitute the cultural or spiritua 
heritage of peoples; 
(b) to use such objects in support of the military effort; 
(c) to make such objects the object of reprisals. 
ARTICLE 54 
Protection of objects indispensable to the survival of the 
civilian population 
I. Starva ti0n of ci"ili:rns as a method of warfare is prohibited. 
2. It is prohibited to attack, destroy, remove or render useless objectf/.,, 
indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, such as foodstu ff ·;· 
agricultural areas for the production of foodstuffs, crops, livestock, drin kin · · 
water installations and supplies and irrigation works, for the spc:cific purpo: . 
of denying them for their sustenance value to the civilian population or to t:.. · · 
adverse Party, whatever the motive, whether in order to starve out civilians, <· ~ · 
cause them to move away, or for any other motive. ·· 
3. The prohibitions in paragraph 2 shall not apply to such of the objl!C 
covered by it as are used by an adverse Party: 
(a) as sustenance solely for the members of its armed forces; or 
(b) if not as sustenance, then in direct support of military action, provide 
however, that in no event shall actions against these objects be tak 
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which may be expected to leave the civilian population with such inade-
quate food or water as to cause its starvation or force its movement. 
4. These objects shall not be made the object of reprisals. 
5. In recognition of the vital requirements of any Party to the conflict in the 
defence of its national territory against invasion, derogation from the 
prohibitions c.ontained in paragraph 2 may be made by a Party to the conflict 
within such territory under its own · control where required by imperative 
military necessity. 
ARTICLE 55 
Protection of the natural environment 
1. Care shall be taken in warfare to protect the natural environment against 
widespread, long-term and severe damage. This protection includes a prohibition 
of the use of methods or means of warfare which are intended or may be expected 
· to cause such damage to the natural environment and thereby to prejudice the 
health or survival of the population. · 
2. Attacks against the natural environment by way of reprisals are prohibited. 
ARTICLE 56 
Protection of works· 2nd installations containing dangerous forces 
l. \Vorks or-installations containing dangerous forces, nam.ely dams, dykes 
and nuclear electrical generating stations, shall not be made the object of attack, 
even where these objects an.: military objectives, if such attack may cause the 
release of dangerous fo rces and consequent severe losses among the civilian 
population. Other military objectives located al or in the vicinity of these works 
or installations shall not be made the object of attack if such attack may cause 
the release of dangerous forces from the works or installations and consequent 
severe losses among the civilian population. 
2. The special protection against attack provided by paragraph l shall 
cease: 
(a) for a dam or a dyke only if it is used for other than its normal function 
and in regular, significant and direct support of military operations and 
if such attack is the only feasible way to terminate such support; 
(b) for a m:cl~ar electrical generating statiori only if it provides electric power 
in regular, significant and direct support of military operations and if 
such attack is the only feasible way to terminate such support ; 
(c) • for other military objectives located at or in the vicinity of these works 
or instailations only if they are used in regular, significant and direct 
support of military operations and if such attack is the only feasible way 
to terminate such support. 
3. In all cases, the civilian population and individual civilians shall remain 
entitled to all the protection accorded them by international law, including the 
protection of the precautionary measures provide~ for in f:r_ticle 57._ If _the 
protection ceases and any of the works, rnstallat1ons or rmlttary obJect1vcs 
mentioned in paragraph 1 is attacked, all practical precautions shall be taken to 
avoid the release of the dangerous forces . 
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4. It is prohibited to make any of the works, installations or military objectives 
mentioned in paragraph I the object of reprisals. 
5. The Parties to the contlict shall endeavour to avoid locating any military 
objectives in the vicinity of the works or installations mentioned in paragraph 1. 
Nevertheless, installations erected for the sole purpose of defending the protected 
works or installations from attack are permissible and shall not themselves be 
made the object of attack, provided that they are not used in hostilities except 
for defensive actions necessary to respond to attacks against the protected works 
or installations and that their armament is limited to weapons capable only of 
· repelling hostile action against the protected works or installations. 
6. The High Contracting Parties and the Parties to the conflict are urged to 
conclude further agreements among themselves to provide additional protection 
for objects containing dangerous forces. 
7. In order to facilitate the identification of the objects protected by this 
Article, the Parties to the conflict may mark them with a special sign consisting 
of a group of three bright orange circles placed on the same axis, as specified 
in Article 16 of Annex I to this Protocol. The absence of such marking in no 
way relieves any Party to the conflict of its obligations under this Article. 
CHAPTER IV 
Precautionary Measures 
ARTICLE 57 
Precautions in attack 
1. In the conduct of military operations, constant care shall be taken to 
spare the civilian population, civilians and civilian objects. 
2. With respect to attacks, the following precautions shall be taken: 
(a) those who plan or decide upon an attack shall: 
. (i) do everything feasible to verify that the objectives to be atlacked 
are neither civilians nor civilian objects and are not subject to special 
protection but are military objectives within the meaning of para-
graph 2 of Article 52 and that it is not prohibited by the provisions 
of this Protocol to :i ltack them; 
(ii) take all feasible precautions in the choice of means a nd methods of 
attack with a v ;t.w to avoicr ng, and in any event to minimizing, 
incidental loss of civilian life, injury to (;ivilian!.. a11c =~·maGe to 
civilian objects; 
(iii) refrain from deciding to launch any attack which may be expected 
to cause incidental Joss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to · 
civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive 
in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated; 
(b) an attack shall be cancelled or suspended if it becomes apparent that the 
objective is not a military one or is subject to special protection or that 
the attack may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury 
to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which 
would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military adv:mtage 
anticipated; 
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(c) efTective advance warning shall be given of attacks which may affect 
the civilian population, unless circumstances do not permit. 
3. When a choice is possible between several military objectives for obtainino 
a similar military advantage, the objective to be selected shall be that the attack 
on which may be expected to cause the least danger to civilian lives and to 
civilian objects. 
4. In the conduct of military operations at sea or in the air, each Party to 
the conflict shall, in conformity with -its rights and duties i_mder the rules of 
international _law applicable in armed conflict, take all reasonable precautions 
to avoid losses of civilian lives and damage to civilian objects. 
5. No provision of this Article may be construed as authorizing any attacks 
against the civilian population, civilians or civilian objects. 
ARTICLE 58 
Precautions against the effects of attacks 
The Parties to the conflict shaU, to the maximum extent feasible: 
(a) without prejudice to Article 49 of the Fourth Convention, endeavour to 
remove the civilian population, individual civilians and ~ivilian objects 
under their control from the vicinity of military objectives; 
(b) avoid locating military objectives within or near densely populated 
areas; 
fc) take the other necessary precautions to protect the . civilian population, 
individuai civilians and ci\'ilian objects under their control against the 
dangers resulting from military operations. 
CHAPTER V 
Localities and Zones under Special Protection 
ARTICLE 59 
Nu:u-!left:m.ic.d localities 
I. It is prohibited for the Parties to the conflict to attack, by any means 
whatsoever, non-defended localities. 
2. The appropriate authorities of a Party to the conflict may declare as a 
non-defended locality any inhabited place near or in a zone where armed forces 
are in contact which is open for occupation by an adverse Party. Such a locality 
shall fulfil the following conditions: 
(a) all combatants, as well as mobile weapons and mobile military equipment 
must have been evacuated; 
(b) no hostile use shall be made of fixed military installations or establish-
ments; 
(c) no acts of hostility shall be committed by the authorities or by the 
population; and 
(d) no activities in support of military operations shall be undertaken. 
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3. The presence, in this locality, of persons specially protected under the 
Conventions and this Protocol and of police forces retained for the sole purpose 
of maintaining law and order is not contrary to the conditions laid down in 
paragraph 2. 
4. The declaration made under paragraph 2 shall be addressed to the adverse 
Party and shall define and describe, as precisely as possible, the limits of the 
non-defended locality. The Party to the conflict to which the declaration is 
addressed shall acknowledge its receipt and shall treat the locality as a non-
defended locality unless the conditions laid down in paragraph 2 are not in 
fact fulfilled, in which event it shall immediately so inform the Party making 
the declaration. Even if the conditions laid down in paragraph 2 are not fulfilled, 
the locality shall continue to enjoy the protection provided by the other pro-
. visions of this Protocol and the other rules of international law applicable in 
armed conflict. 
5. The Parties to the conflict may _agree on the establishment of non-defonded 
localities even if such loc;;alitics do not fulfil the conditions laid down in para-
graph 2. The agreement should define and describe, as precisely as possible, the 
limits of the non-defended locality; if necessary, it may Jay down the methods -
of supervision. 
6. The Party which is in control of a locality governed by such an agreement 
shall mark it, so far as possible, by such signs as may be agreed upon with the 
other Party, which shall be displayed where they are cle;irly visible, especially 
on its perimeter and limits and on highways. 
7. A locality loses its status as a non-defended locality when it ceases to 
fulfil the conditions laid down in paragraph 2 or in the agreement referred to 
in paragraph 5. In such an eventuality, the locality sh;ill continue to enjoy the 
protection provided by the other provisions of this Protocol ancl 1he other rules 
of int_ernational law applicable in armed conflict. · 
ARTlCLE 60 
Demilitarized zones 
l. It is prohibited for the Parties to the conflict to extend their military 
operations to zones on which they have rc11ferred by agreement the status of 
demilitarized zone, if such extension is contrary to the terms ofthjs agrec.r.:-nt. 
2. The agreements-hall be an expre s agreement, may be concluded verbally 
or i.n writing, either directly. or through a Protecting Power or any impartial 
humanitarian organisation, and may consist of reciprocal· and concordant 
declarations. The agreement may be concluded in peacetime, as well as after 
the outbreak of hostilities, and should define and describe, as precisely as 
possible, the limits of the demilitarized zone and, if necessary, lay down the 
methods of supervision. 
3. The subject of such an agreement shall normally be any zone which fulfils 
the following conditions: 
(a) all combatants, as well as mobile weapons and mobile military equipment, 
must bave been evacuated; 
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(b) no hostile use shall be made of fixed military installations or establish-ments; 
(c) no acts of hostility shall be committed by the authorities or by the population; and 
(d) any activity linked to the military effort must have ceased. 
The Parties to the conflict shall agree upon the interpretation to be given to the condition laid down in sub-paragraph (d) and upon persons to be admitted to the demilitarized zone other than those mentioned in paragraph 4. 
4. The presence, in this zone, of persons specially protected under the Conventions and this Protocol, and of police forces retained for the sole purpose of maintaining Jaw and order:, is not contrary to the conditions laid down in paragraph 3 . 
. 5. The Party which is in control of such a zone shall mark it, so far as-possible, by such signs as may be agreed upon with the other Party, which shall be displayed where they are clearly visible, especially on its perimeter and limits and on hi~hways. · 
6. ff the fighting draws near to a demilitarized zone, and if the Parties to the conflict have so agreed, none of them may use the zone for purposes related to · the c·onduct of military operations or unilaterally revoke its status. 
7. If one of the Parties to the conflict commits a material breach of the provisions of paragraphs 3 or 6, the other Party shall be released from its obligations under-the agreement conferring upon the zone the status of demili-. tarized zone. In such an eventuality, the zone loses its status but sh:ill continue to enjoy the protection provided by the other provisions of this Protocol and the other rules of international law applicable in annell conflict. 
CHAPTER VI 
Civil Defence 
ARTICLE 61 
Definitions and scope 
For the purposes of this Protocol: 
(a) "civil defence" me:rns t! e perf, ,;:iance of some or all o; ti1e u ..... .::r-mcntioned.humanitarian tasks intended to protect the civilian population against the dangers, and to help it to recover from the immediate effects, of hostilities or disasters_ and also to provide the conditions necessary for its survival. These tasks are: 
(i) warning; 
(ii) evacuation; 
(iii) management of shelters; 
(iv) management of blackout measures; 
(v) rescue; 
(vi) medical services, including first aid, and religious assistance; 
(vii) fire-fighting; 
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ARTICLE 83 
Dissemination 
l. The High Contracting Parties undertake, in time of peace as in time of 
armed conflict, to_ disseminate the Conventions and this Protocol as widely as 
possible in their respective countries and, in particular, to include the study 
thereof in their programmes of military instruction and to encourage the study . 
thereof by the civilian population, so that those instruments may become known 
to the armed forces and to the civilian population. 
2. Any military or civilian authorities who, in time of armed conflict, 
assume responsibilities in respect of the application of the Conventions and 
this Protocol shall be fully acquainted with the text thereof. 
ARTICLE 84 
Rules of application 
The High Contracting Parties shall communicate to one another:, as soon as 
possible, through the depos-itary and, as appropriate, thro_ugh the Protecting 
Powers, their official translations of this Protocol, as well as the laws and 
regulations which they may adopt to ensur~ its application. 
SECTION JI 
REPRESSION OF BREACHES OF THE CONVENTIONS AND 01' THIS PROTOCOL 
ARTICLE 85 
Repression of breaches of this Protocol 
I. The provisions of the Conventions relating to the_ repression of breaches 
and grave breaches, supplemented by this Section , sball apply to the repression 
of breaches and grave breaches of this Protocol. 
2. Acts described as grave breaches in the Conventions are grave breaches 
of this Protocol if committed against persons in the power of an adverse Party 
protected by Articles 44, 45 and 73 of this Protocol, or against the woui1ded, 
sick and shipwrecked of the adverse Party who are protected by this Protocol, 
or again~: 1bose medical or religious pe1 sonnet, medical uni1s, or medical 
_ transports which are under the contol of '.hf:' ,dv,:r~e Party and are protected 
by this Protocol. 
· 3. In addition to the grave breaches defined in Article 11, the foJiowing acts 
shall be regarded as grave breaches of this Pr9tocol, when committed wilfully, 
· in violation of the relevant µrovisrons of this Protocol, and causing death or 
serious injury to body or health: 
(a) making the civilian population or individual civilians the object of 
attack; 
(b) launching an indiscriminate attack affecting the civilian population or 
civilian objects in the knowledge that sucll attack will cause excessive 
Joss of life, injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects, as defined 
in Article 57, paragraph 2 (a) (iii); 
(c) launching an attack against works or installations containing dangerous 
forces in the knowledge that such attack will cause excessive loss of life, 
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injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects, as defined in Article 57, 
_paragraph _2 (a) (iii); · 
(d) making non-defended localities and demilitarized zones the object of 
attack; 
(e) making a person the object of attack in the knowledge that he is :liars· 
de combat; 
(/) the perfidious use, in violation. of Article 37, of the distinctive emblem 
of the Red Cross, Red Crescent or Red Lion and Sun or of other protective 
signs recognized by the Conventions or this Protocol. 
4. In additi6n to the grave breaches defined in the preceding paragraphs 
. and in the Conventions, the following shall be regarded as grave breaches of 
this Protocol, when committed wilfully and in violation of the Conventions ·or 
the Protocol: 
(a) the transfer by the occupying Power ofp1rts of its own civilian population 
into the territory it occupies, or the deportation or transfer of all or parts 
of the population of the occupied territory within.or outside this territory, 
in violation of Article 49- of the Fo.urth Convention; . 
(b) unjustifiable delay in the repatriation of prisoners of war or civilians; 
(c) practices of apartheid and other inhuman an·d degrading practices involv-
ing outrages upon person:t! dignity, based on racial discrimination; 
(d) making the clearly-recognized historic monuments, works of art or 
places of worship which constitute the cultural or spiritual heritage of 
peoples and to which special protection has been given by special 
arrangement, for example, within the framework of a competent inter-
national organization, the object of attack, causing as a result extensive 
destruction th~reof, where there is no evidence of the violation by the 
adv·::rse Party of Article 53, sub-paragraph (b), and when such historic 
monu111 nt::., works of art and place, of woi ship are not located in the 
immediate proximity of military objectives; 
. (e).depriving a person protected. by th~ Conventions or referred . to in 
paragraph 2 of this Article of the rights of fair and regular trial. 
5. Without prejudice to the application of the Conventions and of thi s 
Protocol, grave breaches of these instrumci1ts shall be regarded as war crimes. 
ARTICLE 86 
Failure to act 
1. The High Contracting Parties and the Parties to the conflict shall repress 
grave breaches, and tah ri1easures necessary to suppress all other breaches, of 
the Conventions or of this Protocol which result from a failure to act when 
under a duty to do so. 
2. The fact that a breach of the Conventions or of this Protocol was com-
mitted by a subordinate d.oes not absolve his superiors from P?nal or d!sciplin~ry 
responsibility, as the case may be, if they knew, or had mformat1on which 
should have enabled them to conclude in the circumstances at the time, that 
he was committing or was going to commit such a breach and if they did not 
take all feasible measures within their power to prevent or repress the breach . 
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ARTICLE 87 
Duty of commanders 
_l. The High Contracting Parties and the Parties to the conflict shall require 
military commanders, with respect to members of the armed forces under their 
command and other-persons under their control, to prevent and, where necessary, 
to suppress and to report to competent authorities breaches of the Conventions 
and of this Protocol. 
2. In order to pr"event and suppress breaches, High Contracting Parties and 
Parties to the co~flict shall require that, commensurate .with their level of 
responsibility, commanders ensure that members of the armed forces under 
. their command are aware of their obligations und~r the Conventions and this 
Protocol. 
3. The High Contracting Parties and Parties to the conflict shall require 
any commander who is aware that subordinates or other persons under his 
control are going to commit or have committed a breach of the Conventions 
or of this Protocol, to initiate such steps as are necessary to prevent such 
violations of the Conventions or . this Protocol, and, where appropriate, .to 
initiate disciplinary .or penal action against violators thereof. 
ARTICLE 88 
Mutual assistance in criminal matters 
l. · The High Contracting Parties shall afford one another tile greatest 
measure of assistance in connection with criminal proceedings brought in 
respect of grave breaches of the Conventions· or of this Protocol. 
2. Subject to the 1ights and obliga tions established in the Conventions and 
in Article 85, paragraph 1, of this Protocol, and when circumstances permit, the 
High Contracting Parties shall co-operate in the matter of extrawtion. They 
shall give due consideration to the request of the State in whose territory the 
alleged offence has occurred. 
3. The law of the High Contracting Party requested shall app°Jy in all cases. 
The provisions of the preceding paragraphs shall not, however, affect the 
obligations arising from the provisions of any other treaty of a bilateral or 
multilateral nalure .vh:s'.1 ~overns or will govern the whole or part of the subject 
of mutual assistance in criminal matters. 
ARTICLE 89 
Co-operatian 
In situations of serious violations of the Conventions or of this Protocol, the 
High Contracting Parties under~ake to act,Jointl!' or indivi~ually, in_co-operation 
with the United Nations and 111 conformity with the Umted Nations Charter. 
1. (a) 
ARTICLE 90 
International Fact-Finding Commission 
An International Fact-Finding Commission (herinaftcr referred to as 
"the Commission") consisting of fifteen members of high moral stand-
ing and acknowledged impartiality shall be established. 
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(b) When not less than twenty High Contracting Parties have agreed to accept the competence of the Commission pursuant to paragraph 2, the depositary shall then, and at intervals of five years thereafter, convene a meeting of representatives of those High Contracting Parties for the purpose of electing the members of the Commission. At the · meeting, the representatives shall elect the members of the Commission by secret ballot from a list of per'softs to·which each-of · those High Contracting Parties may nominate one perso_n. 
(c) The members of the Commission shall serve in their personal capacity and shall hold office until the election of new members at the ensuing meeting; 
(d) At the election, the High Contracting Parties shall ensure. that the persons to be elected to the Commission ·individually possess the qualifications required and that, in the Commission as a while, equitable . geographical representation is assured. 
(e) In the case of a cctsual vacancy, the Commission itself shall fill the vacancy, having due regard to the provisions of the preceding sub-paragraphs. 
(f.) The depositary shall make available to the Commission the necessary administrative facilities for the performance of its-functions . . · 
2. (a). The High Contracting Parties may at the time of signing, ratifying, o~· acceding to the Protocol, or at any other subsequent time, declare that they recognise ipso facto and without special agreement, in relation to any other High Contracting Party accepting the same Qb!igation, the competence of the Commission to enquire into allegations by such other Party, as authorized by this Article. · (b) The declarations referred to above shall be deposited with the · depositary, which shall transmit copies thereof to the J:-1 igh Con! racting Parties. 
(c) The Commissio11 shall be competent to: 
(i) enquire into any facts alleged to be a grave breach as defined in the Conventions and this Protocol or other serious violation of the Conventions or of this Protocol; 
(ii) facilitate, through its good offices, the restoration of an attitude of respect for the Conventions and thi<: Protocol. 
(d) ln other situations, the Commission shall institute an enquiry at the reques·t of a Party to the conflict only with the consent of the other Party or Parties concerned. ·-
(e) Subject to the foregoing provisions of this paragraph, the provisions of Article 52 of the First Convention, Article 53 of the Second Con-vention, Article 132 of the Third Convention and Article 149 of the Fourth Convention shall continue to apply to any alleged violation of the Conventions and shall extend to any alleged violation of this Protocol. 
3. (a) Unless otherwise agreed by the Parties concerned, all enquiries shall be undertaken by a Chamber consisting of seven members appointed as follows: 
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(i) five members of the Commission, not nationals of any Party to 
the conflict, appointed by the President of the Commission on the 
basis of equitable representation of the geographical areas, after 
consultation with the Parties to the conflict; 
(iQ two ad hoe members, not nationals of any Party to the conflict, 
one-to-be appointed by each side. 
(b) Upon receipt of the request· for an enq~iry, the Pre~ident of the · 
Commission shall specify an appropriate time-limit for setting up a 
Chamber. If any ad hoe member has not been appointed within the 
· time-limit, the President shall immediately appoint · such addjtional · 
member or members of the Commission as may be necessary to 
complete the membership of the Chamber. 
4. (a)_ The Chamber set ·up under paragraph 3 to undertake an enquiry shall 
invite the Parties to the conflict to assist it and to present evidence. The 
Chamber may also seek such other evidence as it deems appropriate 
and may carry out an investigation of the situation in loco. 
(b) All evid·ence shall be fuUy disclosed to the Parties, which shall have the 
right to comment on it lo the Commission. 
(c) Each Party shall have the right to chal1enge such evidence . 
. 5. (a) The Commission shall submit to the J:>arties a re_port on the findings of 
fact of the Chamber_, with such recommendations as it may deem 
appropriate. 
(b) If the Chamber is unable to secure sufficient evidence for factual and 
impartial finding5, the Commission shall state the reasons for that 
inability. · · 
(c) The Commission shall not report its findings publicly, unless all th~ 
Parties to the connict have requested the Commission to do so . 
. 6. The Commission shall establish· its own rules, including rules for the 
presidency of the Commission and the presidency oft he Chamber. Those rules 
shall ensure that the functions of the President of the Corn mission are exercised 
at all times and that, in the case of an enquiry, they arc exercised by a person who 
is not a national of a Party to the connict. 
7. The administrative expenses of the Commission shall be met by con-
tributions from the High Contracting J>arties which made decla:ari0ns ur.Jer 
paragraph 2-, and by voluntary contributions. The Party or Parties to the 
·conflict requesting an _enquiry shall advance the necessr1ry funds for expenses 
incurred by a Chamber and sha.11 be reimbursed by th_e Party or Parties agaiQst 
which the allegations are made to the extent of fifty percent of the costs of ttle 
Chamber. Where there are counter-allegations before the Chamber each side 
shall advance fifty percent of the -necessary funds. 
ARTICLE 91 
Responsibility 
A Party to the conflict which violates the provisions of the Conventions or of 
this Protocol shall, if the case demands, be liable to pay compensation. It shall 
be responsible for all acts committed by persons forming part of its armed 
forces. 
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